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RECEIVABLES FROM SECURITY INTERESTS THAT SECURE AN
OBLIGATION

Steven L. Harris
Charles W Jvfooney, Jr. *
"How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg? Four.
Calling a tail a leg doesn 't make it a leg. "
- Abraham Lincoln 1
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l. INTRODUCTION

A finn that is owed money payable in the future may need the money
now. There are two principal ways in which the firm might use its
rights to payment (receivables) to accomplish that result: It might sell its

* Harris is Professor of Law at liT Ch icago-Ke nt College of La w, and Mooney is the Cha rl es
A. Heim bold , Jr. Professor of Law at the U ni vers ity of Penn sylvan ia Law Sc hool.
Un less
con traindi cated. re ferences in the text to "section X-XXX" refer to sec tion s of the Unifotm Commercial
Code. This Artic le benefited from the helpful comments of Fel ice Balian, Kenneth Kettering, Th omas
Plank, Ad ri an Wa lters, and Steven Weise.
l. Abmham Lincoln Quotes, GOO DREA DS , http ://www.goodread s.corn/quotes/8260-how-manyOne of Lincoln' s contemp oraries
legs-does-a-dog-h ave-i f-y ou-call (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) .
rem ini sced about Lincoln makin g this observation wi th respec t to a ca lf. George W. Julian , Lincoln and
the Pro clamation of Emancipa tion, in REMIN ISCENCES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 227, 242 (A llen
Thorndike Rice ed. , Harper & Bros. new & rev. ed. 1909).
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receivables, or it might borrow and use the receivables as collateral to
secure a loan. Either transaction creates a "security interest" under
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. 2 However, different legal
consequences follow depending on whether the transaction is a sale (or,
as it commonly is called, a true sale) or is a security interest that secures
an obligation (a SIS0).3
These legal consequences are particularly salient when the firm enters
bankruptcy. If the transaction is a sale, then the receivables do not
become part of the firm's bankruptcy estate, and the buyer can collect
them as if no bankruptcy had ensued. 4 If, however, the transaction is a
SISO, then the receivables do become property of the firm's bankruptcy
estate. 5 As such, they may be used by the firm during the bankruptcy
and cannot be collected by the secured party unless the bankruptcy court
orders otherwise.6 The bankruptcy consequences of the distinction
between a true sale and a SISO form the cornerstone of securitization, or
"structured finance ," transactions. In these transactions, a firm obtains
needed cash by selling its receivables to an entity whose sole purpose is
to buy the receivables and issue securities (often, publicly traded debt
securities). 7 The value of the securities depends solely on the value of
the receivables. Unlike the firm's secured debt, the value of the
securities issued by the buyer is not affected by the financial condition
of the firm.
If the firm enters bankruptcy, creditors have an incentive to argue that
a transaction that is structured and documented as a true sale creates a
SISO in substance and so should be treated as a SISO in the bankruptcy.
Such a recharacterization poses a great risk to the holders of securities
issued by the buyer in a securitization. Unless the bankruptcy court
treats a securitization transaction as a true sale of the receivables, the
2. "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fi xtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation. 'Securi ty interest' includes any interest of a . .. buyer of accounts,
chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9."
U.C.C . § l-201(b)(3 5) (2008). Article 9 generally app lies to transacti ons, regardless of th eir fonn, that
create a security interest by contract, as well as to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles,
an d promissory notes. U.C.C. § 9- 109(a)( l ), (3) (2010).
3. See infra Part III. SISOs also are known as "collateral ass ignments" and "transfers for
security."
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 54 l(a)( l) (20 12) (providing that the estate incl udes "all legal or equitable
in terests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case").
5. See id. More prec isely, the firm 's interest in the receivables becomes property of the
bankruptcy estate.
6. See id. § 363(c)( l )-(2) (providing that the trustee in bankruptcy genera ll y " may use property
of th e estate in the ordin ary course of business" and specifyin g the conditi ons under whi ch the trustee
may use cash collateral) ; id. § 362(a)(3) (prohibiting the takin g of "any act to obtain possess ion of
property of th e estate ... or to exercise control over property of th e estate"); id. § 362(a)(4) (pro hibiting
th e taking of "any act to ... enforce any lien against property of the estate").
7. Typical securitization transactions are described in greater detail infra Part III.

2014]

WHEN

Is A DoG'S TAIL NOT A LEG?

1031

transaction will not accomplish its intended purpose. If the court
recharacterizes a purported sale as a SISO, the receivables will become
property of the firm's bankruptcy estate, thereby reducing the value of
the securities to the security holders. 8
Because a true sale and a SISO share many attributes, both courts and
scholars have found it difficult to di stinguish between them in
securitization and other complex transactions . Article 9 includes
important prov1s10ns whose application depends on whether a
transaction is a true sale or a SISO, yet the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) provides virtually no guidance for characterizing a transaction,
leaving that task to the courts. 9 The existing case law is confused and
confusing, and the resulting uncertainty increases the costs (and thereby
reduces the value) of securitizations. 1° Commentators have suggested a
variety of approaches to characterization, but none has been wholly
successnd. Most rely on a balancing of specific factors that by necessity
results in uncertainty. 11 Professor Kenneth Kettering's approach, which
would recharacterize a purported sale as a SISO only when necessary to
promote the purpose of recharacterization, gives more guidance. But by
ignoring the economic differences between the two transactions, it too
falls short. 12
We offer in this Article our own methodology for determining
whether a purported true sale is a SISO. First, one must identify the
specific allocation of rights between the purported buyer and seller and
determine whether the seller has retained any meaningful economic
interest in the receivables. Second, even if the seller has retained some
economic interest in the receivables, one must determine whether that
interest secures an obligation of the seller. The requisite obligation need
8. A court that applies nonbankruptcy law to determine whether a purported sa le is a S fSO
looks to the nature of the transaction at the time it is entered into. In that sense, the co urt
'·characterizes," rather th an "recharacterizes" the transaction. We refer to a court as " rec haracterizing"
to cont rast the cou n 's later characterization of the transaction with the parties' earlier characterizat ion.

9. U.C.C. § 9- 109 cmts. 3, 4 (2010) . Article 9 does indicate, however, that a transaction may be
a tme sale even if the buyer is entitled to charge back un collected collatera l or to full or li mited recourse
aga inst the seller. See id. § 9-207(d)( I). On the relevance of recourse, see infra Part V.A- B.
l 0. As one court exp lain ed:
The extensive case law is almost no help ....
The absence of any set legal ana lys is, along with the annoying tendency of decisions to tum on
the ir facts, makes predictin g the outcome of a loan/tme sa le d ispute nearl y impossible. See
Hearing on Bankntptcy Refo rm Act of 1999 (H.R. 833) (Statement of S. Grosshandler, Part ner,
Cleary, Gott li eb, Steen & Hami lton) (available at www.house.gov/judiciary/l 06- gros.htm)
(observi ng that th e legal ana lys is is "hi ghly subj ective" and that issuing "true sale opin ions" in
connection with so me transacti ons is therefore "extremely ditlicu lt, costly, and in a few cases,
impossible'').

In re Commercial Loan Corp ., 316 B.R. 690,700-01 (Bankr. N.D. [II. 2004).
11. See infra Part !V.B.l (discussing the principal approac hes taken by commentators).
12. See inji-a Part IV.B.2 (disc ussing Kettering's approach).
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not be a binding contractual obligation. It may be implied when the
terms of the transaction, as viewed from the outset, are such that, to
avoid losing its interest in the receivables, the seller would be
economically compelled to make a payment to the buyer. This propertybased approach builds on the analysis of the characterization issue by
others and borrows directly from the existing learning, literature, case
law, and codification concerning an analogous determination: whether a
true lease of goods should be recharacterized as a SISO. By focusing on
the essential attributes of a SISO, we provide a workable way in which
to give effect to the policy underlying recharacterization. 13
Because the true sale-SISO distinction is so crucial to securitization
transactions, we focus on the distinction as it arises in that context. We
begin in Part II with a brief description of a typical securitization
transaction and a summary of various critiques and defenses of
securitization presented in the legal literature. Part III explains what is
at stake if a purported true sale is recharacterized outside bankruptcy.
Part IV first reviews and criticizes the approach toward the
recharacterization issue that characterizes the case law and then
addresses the efforts at rationalizing the case law that others have taken.
In Part V we develop our own methodology, which we illustrate with
specific examples.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECURITIZATION
A securitization typically entails a sale of receivables by an originator
to a separate entity, which sale is accompanied by the buying entity's
issuance of securities. 14 For commercial law and bankruptcy purposes,
the core concept is that the originator has transferred ownership of the
receivables to the buyer and no longer has any interest in them.15 The
buyer in many cases will be a special purpose entity (SPE) fonned
solely to participate in the securitization transaction and whose activities
are limited to such participation. In many cases the SPE is a whollyowned subsidiary of the originator. 16 Funds received from the SPE ' s
13. We offer our methodology fo r use in th e commercial law and bankruptcy settin gs. The
distincti on between a tme sale and a SISO may affect a transaction 's tax an d accou ntin g treatment;
ho wever, those settin gs may im plicate diffe rent policies and so may di ctate a different methodology.
14 . The fo llowing overview is based in large part on Kenn eth C. Ketterin g, Securitiza rion and Its
Discontenrs: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 2 9 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1553, 1564--66
(2008 ) [herein after Kettering, Discontents].
15. Some transactions (for accountin g reasons) employ a " two-tier" stmcture in whi ch th e buyer
transfers the receivables to a second buyer, whi ch th en issues the securities and pays over the proceeds
to the t! rst buyer. The key point for the securiti zation 's effectiveness is that the sa le to the fi rst bu yer be
a tm e sale.
16. The receivables typi cally woul d be of a value in excess of th at needed to pay th e debt
sec urities issued by the SPE. The ori ginator would indirectly retain the benefit of the excess value
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issuance of securities are used to pay the originator the purchase price
for the receivables. 17 Various arrangements attempt to ensure that the
SPE will be "bankn1ptcy remote," i.e., that the SPE will not itself
become subject to a bankruptcy proceeding and that, if the originator
enters bankruptcy, the SPE and the originator will not be substantively
consolidated and treated as a single entity. The goal is that a future
bankruptcy of the originator will have no effect on the SPE' s right and
ability to collect the receivables. 18
To date, this goal has been achieved. During the past twenty-five
years the volume of securitization transactions in the United States has
grown exponentially. 19 A setback occurred in 2008, when new
securitizations virtually came to a halt as a result of the financial crisis,20
but the product has rebounded since then and can be expected to be an
important method of financing in the future? 1
Several legal scholars have criticized secuntlzation transactions on
both doctrinal and normative grounds. 22 The legal academic literature

through its equity interest in the SPE. In an alternative structure, the originator sells the receivables to a
trust that holds legal title for the benefit of the holders of pass-through certificates representing the
beneficial interest in the receivables. See Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A
Prudent Legal Stntcture and a Fancifit! Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 641--42 (2008) [herei nafter
Plank, Sense].
17. Alternatively, proceeds of the issuance may be paid to the originator as a return on its equity
interest in the SPE.
18. Of course, if the SPE has credit recourse against the originator (e.g., the originator has agreed
to repurchase defaulted receivables or has guaranteed payment of the receivables), the originator' s
bankruptcy would impair the SPE's ability to enforce the recourse obligation. But the bankruptcy would
not impair its rights in respect of the receivables themselves.
19. See Plank, Sense, supra note 16, at 618.
20 . In its press release an nouncing the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Faci lity (T ALF), the Federal Reserve Board observed: "New issuance of ABS [asset-backed securities]
declined precipitously in September and came to a halt in October." Press Release, BD . OF GOVERNORS
OF
THE
fED.
RESERVE
SYS.
(Nov.
25,
2008),
http://www. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm. T ALF was "a facility that
will help market participants meet the credit needs of households and sma ll businesses by supporting the
iss uance of asset-backed securiti es (ABS) collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans,
and loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA)." !d.
21. See Plank, Sense, supra note 16, at 617-18, 618 n.4. For an illustration of the dec line in the
vo lume of the global issuanc e of asset-backed securities fro m 2006 through 2011, see American
Securitization Forum Presentati on for the Financial Stabili ty Board, Current Market and Regulatory
Enviro nment
for
Securitization,
at
2
(April
10,
2012),
http ://www. americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/ ASF_FSB _Presentation_4-1 0-12.pdf.
For a
compari son of the vo lume of issuance of asset-backed sec urities in th e United States in 2006 and 2011,
by asset class, see !d. at 3.
22. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rollen Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055 (1998); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 101 (1997); Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
30 1 (2002); Lynn M. LoP ucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. I (1996); Stephen J. Lubben,
Beyond True Sales: Securitization and Chapter 11, I N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 89 (2004); Lois R. Lupica,
Revised Article 9, The Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments and Securitizing Debtors and Their
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also includes strong appreciation for the benefits of securitization as
well as robust support for its doctrinal and normative soundness.23
Regardless of whether this support is warranted (we generally think it
is), securitization is here to stay? 4 Accordingly, in this Article we avoid
that debate. We take as given that the commercial law distinction
between true sales and SISOs applies to securitization transactions, and
we provide a methodology for drawing the distinction that is both
practical and theoretically sound.
III. CHARACTERIZATION UNDER ARTICLE 9 AND NONBANKRUPTCY LAW:
WHAT ARE THE STAKES OUTSIDE OF B ANKRUPTCY?

Although the need to characterize a securitization transaction as a true
sale or SISO typically arises in the originator' s bankruptcy, we begin
with nonbankruptcy law. As the Supreme Court explained, "[p ]roperty
interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding." 25 Proceeding on the widely
shared understanding that the nonbankruptcy standard for characterizing
a transfer of property also applies in bankruptcy, we focus on the
characterization of a transaction as a true sale of receivables or as a
SISO for purposes ofUCC Article 9? 6
Creditors, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 32 1 (2002); Lois R. Lupi ca, Revised Article 9, Securitization
Transactions and th e Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 287 (200 1); Lois R. Lupica,
Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory lnslitutionalization of Securitization , 33 CO NN.
L. REV. 199 (2000); Loi s R. Lupica, Asset Securitizmion: The Unsecured Creditor 's Perspective, 76
TEX .L.REV . 595 (1998~
23. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Pride and Prej udice in Securitization: A Reply to Professo r
Plank, 30 CARDOZO L. R EV . 1977 (2009) ; Plank, Sense, supra note 16; Thomas E. Plank, Th e Securitv
of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1655 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REv. 13 13 (2009); Steven L. Sc hwarcz, The A lchemJ' of Asset
Securitization, 1 STAN. JL. Bus. & FIN. 133, 135-45 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, Th e Parts Are
Greater than the Who le: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance
and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLU:Vl. Bus. L. REv. 139 (1993).
24. Kettering, wh o thinks " the doctrinal foundation s of the prototypical securitizatio n transaction
are shaky," Kettering, Discontents, supra note 14, at 1632, acknow ledges thi s point:
If ... a court ho lds authoritative ly th at the lega l doctrin es on which the edifice of securi tization
was constmcted do not achi eve the hoped-for result .. . the result would be cataclysmic . ... It
seems improbab le that a court that is fully awa re of these consequ ences would be willing to
acc ept the responsibility of causing rhem by ruling that the legal doctrine s relied upon to support
securitization do not do their job.

!d. at 1632- 33.
25. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 , 55 (1979).
26 . Tl1e preva iling v iew, which we share, is that nonbankmptcy law determines wheth er a
tran sacti on is a sa le or a S ISO for bankmptcy purposes. However, Kenneth Kettering has suggested
othe rwise. Kenneth C. Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A Pwposive Analysis, 16 A.l'vl. B ANKR.
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The miginal UCC Article 9 covered sales of certain receivables:
accounts and chattel paper. 27 By expanding the definition of "account"
and by including sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes,
revised Article 9 expanded the scope of the article to cover sales of
virtually all types of receivables. 28 The principal effect of covering sales
of receivables in Article 9 is to subject them to the perfection and
priority rules applicable to SISO transactions (subject to an important
exception, discussed below).Z 9 Because Article 9 now covers most sales
of receivables, in many circumstances the true sale versus SISO issue
will have no relevance for commercial law purposes. However, there
are some important aspects of Article 9 that do tum on the true saleSISO dichotomy. 30
In a true sale of receivables, the debtor (seller) 31 would not be entitled
to a surplus or liable for a deficiency following a default because there is
lNST. L. REV. 511, 558-62 (2008) [hereinafter Kettering, True Sale]. Kettering also has argued that
bankruptcy policy might fairly be understood to require that receivables sold in a securitization be
included in the originator's bankruptcy estate and has suggested ways in which the Bankruptcy Code
might be applied to accomplish this result. Kettering, Discontents, supra note 14, at 1585- 1632. To
date, bankruptcy courts have not adopted these arguments, and Kettering has acknowledged that they are
unlikely to do so advertently. Nevertheless, the arguments may raise problems for securitization and
other transactions in future bankruptcies .
In a future article, we will consider securitization in the context of bankruptcy law and
explain why the nonbankruptcy characterization of a transaction should and does apply in bankruptcy
and articulate the reasons why bankruptcy policy, properly understood, is wholly consistent with giving
respect in bankruptcy to securiti zation transactions that nonbankruptcy law characterizes as true sales.
We also will explain why Kettering's potential bankruptcy policy analysis of true sales, fraudulent
transfers, and substantive consolidation fails.
27. The 1962 official text of Article 9 applied "to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel
paper." U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (1962). The 1972 revisions expanded the definition of "accounts" to
include receivables that previously had been classified as "contract rights," compare id. § 9-106 (1972),
with id. § 9-106 (1962), and eliminated all references to the latter, co mpare id. § 9-102(1) (1972), with
id. § 9-1 02( 1) ( 1962 ).
28 . "Revi sed Article 9" refe rs to the revision of Article 9 approved by the UCC's sponsors (Tne
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commiss ioners on Uniform State Laws) in
1998. The categories of receivables that were added to the definition of "account" and those that were
included in the definition of "payment intangibles" were classified as general intangibles under Former
Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962) (defining "general intangibles"). Former Article 9 did not apply
to sales of general intangibles of any category. The drafting history of the current definitions of
"account" and "payment intangible" appears in Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for
Securitizations: A Brief HistOI)', 73 AM. B ANKR. L.J. 167 (1999), and Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CH!.KENTL. REv. 1357,1369- 74 (1999).
Our references to "receivables" include the four types of receivables defined in Article 9:
account (defined in § 9-1 02( a)(2 )), chattel paper (defined in § 9-1 02(a)(ll )), payment intangible
(defined in § 9-1 02(a)(61 )), and promissory note (defined in § 9-l 02(a)(65)).
29. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 5 (2010).
30. For a more detai led description and analysis of these aspects of Article 9, see Kettering, True
Sale, supra note 26, at 532- 39.
31. Article 9 defines "debtor" and ''secured party" to include, respectively, a seller and buyer of
receivables. U.C.C. § 9-1 02(a)(28) (defining "debtor"); id. § 9-1 02(a)(73) (defining "secured party").
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no secured obligation and consequently there could be no "default" as
contemplated by Article 9. 32 For the same reason, the dt:~tor (seller) in a
sale transaction has no right to redeem the collateral:'_) Moreover, a
number of duties imposed on a secured party in a SISO transaction are
not imposed on the secured party (buyer) in a sale transaction. 34 These
distinctions generally reflect the fact that a secured party (buyer) has
acquired the entire interest of the debtor (seller) in the receivables sold. 35
Revised Article 9 emphatically makes this point by providing that "[a]
debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or
promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the
collateral sold." 36
The most significant example of Article 9 treating a true sale
differently from a SISO does not follow from the inherent economic
differences between the two transactions.
Under the "automatic
perfection" rule for sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes,
the security interest of a buyer of either type of receivable is perfected
upon attachment. 37 If a purported sale of such receivables were
32. U.C.C. § 9-608(b) (application of proceeds of collection or enforcement); id. § 9-615(e)
(application of proceeds of a disposition). Both of the cited subsections provide that if the underlying
transaction is a sale of receivables, "the obligor is not liable for any deficienc y." However, in sale
transactions there is no "obligor" because there is no secured obligation. Id. § 9-1 02(a)(5 9) defines
"obligor" as:
a person that, with respect to an obligation secured by a security interest in ... the collateral, (i)
owes payment or other performance of the obligation, (ii) has provided property other than the
collateral to secure payment or other performance of the obligation, or (iii) is otherwi se
accountable in who!~ or in part for payment or other performance of the obligation.
Reading these provisions charitably, the reference in each should be understood as a reference to the
debtor (seller), not to an obligor.
33. Jd. § 9-623.
34. See, e.g., id. § 9-209(c) (duty to release account debtor not applicable to buyer of
receivables); id. § 9-21 O(b) (duty to respond to requests for accounting, list of collateral, and statement
of account); id. § 9-608(a) (duties with respect to application of proceeds and surplus); id. §§ 9-620, 9621, 9-622 (duties with respect to acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of obligation). ln addition,
certain duties apply in a sale of receivables transaction only if there is a right of charge back or full or
limited recourse exists. Jd. § 9-207(d) (duty of care as to collateral under secured party's possession or
control); id. § 9-607(c) (duty to collect or enforce in commercially reasonable manner).
35. Two exceptions to the priority rules relating to future advances also reflect the idea that those
rules, which tum on the timing of "advances," do not make sense in the case of a buyer of rec eivables.
!d. § 9-323(a), (b); see also Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 535- 36, 536 n.l 05.
36. U.C.C. § 9-318(a). For purposes of priority, however, if a security interest held by a buyer of
an account or chattel paper is unperfected, then the debtor (seller) is deemed to have the ri ghts and title
that was sold. !d. § 9-318(b). This puts the priority of an unperfected sec urity interest in sold
receivables on a par with the priority of a SISO. Section 9-318(a) was intended to reject the holding of
Octagon Gas 3ys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (1Oth Cir. 1993): because a buyer of a receivable
acquires a security interest, the debtor (seller) necessarily retains some legal or equitable interest.
37. U.C.C. § 9-309(a)(3) (payment intangible); id. § (a)(4) (promissory note). This rule
represents an accommodation to entrenched practices in the bank loan participation market and
recogni zes that filing and searching in that market would be impracticable. For the background of this
rule, see Shupack, supra note 28; Harris & Mooney, supra note 28, at 1369- 74 .
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recharacterized as a SISO, however, the security interest held by the
purported buyer would be unperfected unless a financing statement had
been filed. 38 In that posture, the battle over recharacterization would
have high stakes indeed. But in securitization and other transactions
outside of the loan participation and mortgage loan markets,
precautionary filing of financing statements is the norm, even when true
sale treatment is perceived as highly likely, so for most transactions the
stakes for recharacterization are not so high. 39
Practitioners and commentators alike have assumed that in typical
securitization transactions the relevant "sale" may qualify as a "sale"
within the meaning of section 9-1 09(a)(3) so as to be within the scope of
Article 9. 4 ° Kettering suggests, however, that "a respectable argument
can be made" that one such typical transaction-a capital contribution of
receivables by the originator to an SPE in exchange for stock issued by
the SPE-is not a "sale" and so is excluded from Article 9. 41 He notes
that Article 9 does not define "sale" or "buyer" with respect to
receivables and observes that, "[i]n common parlance, 'sale ' does not
include every absolute conveyance, but only one made in exchange for a
price in money paid or promised to be paid."42 It follows, the argument
goes, that a "sale" does not include capital contributions or barter
transactions. 43
Excluding non-SISO capital contributions of receivables from the
scope of Article 9 would not affect the need to determine, and the basis
for determining, whether any given contribution was a SISO or an
outright assignment. Although Article 9 distinguishes between SISOs
and true sales, it does not itself provide a method for distinguishing
between the two. Thus the common law governs the characterization
issue, regardless of whether the assignment transaction is covered by
Article 9. 44 Nevertheless, the stakes for securitizers and their investors
would be substantial if Article 9 did not apply to non-SISO capital
38. U .C.C. § 9-31 O(a). The purported buyer' s sec urity interes t in promissory notes also cou ld be
perfec ted by the sec ured party's taking possession, id. § 9-3 13(a), or temporarily with out fi ling or the
taking of possession, id. § 9-3 12( e).
39. Of course, fo r th e sec ured party who fails to fil e or perfe ct its security interes t by anot her
method, recharacteri za ti on can be fatal. This proved to be the case in the Commerci al M oney Ce nter
bankruptcy. See In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc ., 350 B.R. 465, 473-79 (B.A.P . 9th C ir. 2006)
(holding that a pu rported true sa le of payment intangibles was a S!SO); In re Commercial Money Ctr. ,
Lnc., 392 B.R. 8 14 (B .A.P. 9th Ci r. 2008) (holding that the SISO was unperfec ted and so avo idab le by
the trustee in bankmptcy) .
40 . U.C.C . § 9- 109(a)(3).
41. Kettering, T111e Sale, supra note 26, at 5 13 n.5.
42. !d. (citing BLACK'S L AW DI CT IONARY 1364 (8th ed. 2004)).
43. !d.
44. "[N]either this Artic le [9] nor the definiti on of 'sec urity interest' ... delineates h01v a
parti cular transaction is to be class ified. That issue is left to th e courts." U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4.
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contributions. Article 9 specifies the steps that are necessary to create
an enforceable sale of receivables, resolves competing claims to
receivables that have been sold, repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,
details the obligations of persons obligated on these receivables, and to a
considerable extent overrides legal and contractual restrictions on
assignment. 45 If non-SISO capital contributions are excluded trom
Article 9, resolution of these issues would be left to nonuniform- and
considerably less certain-common law.
Indeed, the UCC sponsors' predominant motivation for bringing sales
of virtually all types of receivables into Revised Article 9-by
expanding the definition of "accounts" and adding sales of payment
intangibles and promissory notes- was to provide for the first time a
coherent, accessible, and uniform body of law to govern these transfers
as well as to subject most of them to Article 9's public-notice regime. 46
These reforms were thought to be important in particular because of the
prominence of receivables sales in securitizations. 47 It would be an
unfortunate and surprising result were Article 9 construed so as not to
embrace transfers of receivables m connection with a typical
securitization structure. 48
This statutory construction 1ssue 1s unlikely to anse with any
frequency. Although in many securitization transactions some of the
value of the receivables transferred to the buyer is treated as a capital
contribution, only rarely is the entire value of the receivables so treated.
That is, in the vast proportion of transactions in which the buyer makes a
capital contribution, the buyer also pays money to the seller in exchange
45. !d. § 9-203(b) (conditions to creation of an enforceable sale) ; id. § 9-317(a) (priority as
against lien creditor); id. § 9-322(a) (priority as against competing secured party) ; id. § 9-205 (repeal of
Benedict v. Ratner); id. § 9-406 (discharge of account debtor); id. § 9-408 (effect of legal and
contractual restrictions on assignment). Benedict v. Ratner held that an assignment of accounts
receivabl e that reserves to the assign or "dominion inconsistent with the effective disp os ition of title and
creation of a lien'' is a fraudulent trans fer. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363 (I 925) (applying N ew
York law).
46. Shupack, supra note 28; Harris & Mooney, supra note 28, at 13 72- 73. Note, however, that
the application of Article 9 to sales of pa yment intangibles and promissory notes does not implicate the
issue of public notice. The common law contains no public notice or perfecti on requirement, and sales
of payment intangibles and promi ssory notes are automatically perfected under Revised Article 9.
U.C.C. § 9-309(3). (4). However, a bu y~r of these types of receivables may improve its priority by
filing a fin anc ing statement covering them. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Using First
Principles ofUCC Article 9to Solve Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 297,
309- ll (20 ll ). Con tra Thomas E. Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling Fundamemal PmpertF
Principles and Plain Language, 68 Bus. LAW. 439 (2013).
47. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 C:HI.KENT L. REV. 947 ( 1999); Shupack, supra note 28.
48. Although his art icle expresses no view on th e statutory con struction issue, Kettering
"agree[s] that it would be a bad thing for Article 9 not to apply to such transac ti o ns." Memorandum
from Ken Kettering to Steve Harris and Chuck Mooney 9 (July 29, 2013) [here inafter Ketterin g
Memorandum] (on file with authors).
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for the receivables. There is no reason why these transactions, in which
the capital contribution is only one component of the price, would not
qualifY as sales.
In addition, we see no reason why the word "sale" in Article 9 should
be limited to transactions in which the price is paid in money. If, for
example, the buyer (say, an SPE) is newly formed for the purpose of the
transaction and the seller receives newly issued equity in exchange for
the receivables, we would understand the transaction to be a sale and the
equity to be the price of receivables. Even where the seller already
owns equity in the buyer and the capital contribution has the effect of
increasing the value of the buyer's equity holdings, the seller has
received this increased value in exchange for the receivables. It follows
that this increased value should be the price of the receivables and that
the transaction should be considered a sale. 49
The interpretation of the scope of Article 9 in this context- what is a
"sale"?-is illuminated by the explicit transactional exclusions provided
in section 9-1 09( d). Certain sales and assignments of receivables are
excluded from Article 9 because they do not relate to commercial
financing transactions. 50 No one disputes that securitizations are
commercial financing transactions. 51 The application of Article 9 to
securitization transactions was a focus of the revision effort, yet Revised
Article 9 does not exclude outright transfers (sales) of interests in
receivables as a contribution of capital in exchange for stock or as
barter. Indeed, as far as we know, the participants in the revision
process assumed that these transactions were "sales" within the meaning
of Article 9. This suggests that "sale" should not be restricted to
outright transfers in exchange for money paid or promised to be paid. 52

49. We also think that such a capital contribution constitutes "value" for purposes of § 9203(b)( l ). A sell er that transfers receivables in a sec uritization transaction and receives credit for a
capital contributi on is not makin g a gift of the receivables. See U.C.C. § 1-204(4) (explaining that a
person g ives "'value" for rights if the person "acquires them in return for any cons iderat ion sufficient to
support a simple contact" ). C.f In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp. , 6 F.3d 1119, 11 29 (5th Cir. 1993)
(hold ing that indirect benefits to a corpora tion for making payments owed by an affi liate was "value"
within the meanin g of the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code); Rubin v. Mfrs.
Hanover Trust Co., 66 1 F.2d 979, 991-92 (2d Cir. 198 1) (discussing the indirect economic benefit to a
tran sfe ror as "value").
50. See U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1962), U.C. C. § 9-109(d)(4), (5 ), (6), (7) (2010); U. C.C. § 9-109 cmt.
12 (" Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (d) exclude from the Article certain sales and
assignments of rece ivables that, by their nature, do not concern commerc ial financin g transactions.").
51. Indeed, Kettering claims that "[t]he finan cing obtained by an Originator through the use of
th e prototypical sec uritization structure is economically equivalent to a nonrecourse loan by the
fi nan ciers to th e Originator that is secured by the assets used to support the fin ancin g." Ketterin g,
Disconlems, supra note 14, at 15 70.
52. Drawing negative impli cations from statutory language is not a preferred method of statutory
interpretation. It may be risky and may lead to erroneous conclusi ons. In this situ ati on, however, the
argume nt is one th at an advocate likely would make in any litigation on the issue, and it is plausible that
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Indeed, one might read section 1-103 as compelling courts to reject such
a restriction. 53
To sum up on the stakes of recharacterization outside of bankruptcy,
the true sale-SISO determination can be quite significant under Article 9
when a purported buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes is
relying on automatic perfection. In other contexts, however, two
alternative generalizations apply: either Article 9 treats sales in
essentially the same fashion as SISO transactions, or its differing
treatment coherently reflects the inherent economic differences between
the two types of transactions.
IV. TRUE SALE VERSUS SISO: CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY

A. Case Law
We agree with most earlier observers that the case law addressing the
proper characterization of a self-styled "sale" of receivables is
confusing, inconsistent, and often incoherent, even though many
reported decisions may have reached the correct results. Many of the
opinions identify "factors" that represent either the "benefits" or
"burdens" of ownership and then determine which of the benefits and
burdens have been allocated to the purported seller and which have been
allocated to the purported buyer. 54 The number of factors to which
courts have referred is quite large, and although the courts take some
factors into account more frequently than others, no standard list has
developed. 55
a court would afford the argument at least some weight.
53. U.C.C. § l-103 (a) provides as fo llows :
(a) [The Uniform Commercial Code) must be liberall y construed and ap plied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies, which are:
(I) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governin g comm ercia l tran sa ctions ;
(2) to permit the continued expansion of commerci al practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties; and
(3) to make unifotm the law among the various jurisdictions.
54. For an excellent but conci se discussion (which is somewhat dated, but still relevant) of th e
case law, see Robert D. Aich er & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of Receivables
as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon BankrupTcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 186- 98
( 199 1); see also Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 515-16 (disc ussing factors relied on by courts
and comparing approach to early analyses of true lease versus SISO issue); Thomas E. Plank, The True
Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, !4 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 28 7, 290-9 1, 3 13-28 ( 199 1)
[hereinafter, Plank, True Sale] (discussing factors relied on by courts).
55. John Hilson provides a nonexhaustive list of fifteen factors that "have turned up in cases as
bearing on the 'true sale' question in the context of ascertaining whether the accou nts form part of the
bankruptcy estate of the seller .. . ." JOHN FRANCES HILSON, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A PRACTICt\L
GU IDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2:5.3 (20 13). He identifies the fo llowing as perhaps the most
important: the level of any recourse the buyer may have again st the seller with respec t to the
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The opinions suffer from two serious deficiencies. First, the factors
to which courts refer are in fact consistent with both a tme sale and a
SISO. Standing alone, these factors cannot be outcome-determinative,
and the fact that they are not necessary attributes of either a sale or a
SISO makes them, at best, umeliable indicators of the economic
substance of a transaction. Second, although several commentators have
offered approaches to deal with the not unusual situation in which some
of the perceived benefits and burdens are assigned to the purported
buyer and others remain with the purported seller, none of the
approaches has found favor with the courts.
Judicial opinions that rely on factors to determine the characterization
of a transaction often are based on the following false syllogism:
Premise 1: Factor X is a typical attribute of ownership of receivables.
Premise 2: Factor X is an attribute of purported seller A's relationship
to the receivables.
Conclusion: Purported seller A remains the owner of the receivables,
and purported buyer B holds only a SISO.
Alternatively, the following false syllogism sometimes applies:
Premise 1: Factor Y is an attribute of ownership of receivables.
Premise 2: Factor Y is not an attribute of purported buyer B's
relationship to the receivables.
Conclusion: Purported buyer B is not the owner of the receivables
and holds only a SISO.
For example, some courts have considered the purported seller's
continued servicing (collecting and enforcing) of the transferred
receivables to be an indication that the transaction was not a tme sale. It
is a tmism that some owners of receivables service their own
receivables, especially if they have not sold them. But it is also tme that
some owners of receivables engage third parties to perform this
function. Allowing the seller to continue servicing the receivables as the
buyer's agent may well be the buyer's most efficient means of collecting
them. The physical transfer of the servicing function is not without its
costs. And especially when the seller originated the receivables, the
seller's continuing relationship with the account debtors (obligors) may
increase the likelihood of payment. The mere absence of a factor
commonly associated with ownership does not compel the conclusion
that the purported owner is not the tme owner. Indeed, the allocation of
the servicing function per se is irrelevant to the characterization of the
transaction. 56
receivables; whether the seller collects the receivables and, if so, whether the seller is allowed to hold
the proceeds and commingle them with its own funds; the purchase price; whether the parties' books
reflect the transaction as a sale; and whether the buyer's return from the receivables is limited. !d.
56. Some cases have concluded that continued servicing combined with the seller-servicer's
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Some factors relied upon by the courts appear to address the parties'
intentions or motivations as inferred from the terms of the transaction or
the behavior of the purported buyer. The intuition underlying these
factors is that if a purported buyer were really the owner under a true
sale, it never would have agreed to such terms or behaved in such a
manner. For example, terms that permit the purported seller to modify
or compromise the receivables postsale fall into this category. 57 But
these facts do not aid the recharacterization analysis. Particularly when
the buyer and seller have a continuing relationship and the seller has a
stake in maintaining its reputation, it may make good sense for the buyer
to delegate such discretion to the seller. Or, it may be that the buyer
agreed to improvident terms. In a similar vein, there is some case law
support for the notion that a buyer's failure to independently investigate
the creditworthiness of account debtors on transferred receivables
suggests that the parties intended a secured loan rather than a sale. 5 8 But
a buyer might properly rely on a seller's representations and warranties
or on recourse against the seller instead of on an independent
investigation. At most these types of factors might raise a suspicion
warranting further analysis of the transaction. They should not,
however, carry any weight in the analysis itself. 59
The recharacterization case law not only relies on factors that, if not
altogether irrelevant, are unreliable proxies for the economic substance
of the transaction, it also lacks a method for resolving cases in which
some of the factors appear to point in one direction and some in another.
Over the past twenty-five years, several commentators have offered
commingling of collections with its own funds is a stron g indication that the purported seller rem ained
the owner. See, e.g., People v. Serv. lnst., Inc ., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)
(nonnotification, collections, and commingling). While such commingling might prevent the buyer
from identifying the collected funds and so deprive the buyer of any property interest in them, th e fac t of
commingling should not of itself detennine that the buyer is not the owner of th e uncoll ec ted
receivables. Owners someti mes enable third parties to deprive them of their property . See, e.g., U .C. C.
§ 2-403(2) ("Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of th at kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the en truster to a buyer in ordinary course of business .•· ).
57. See, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1340 (W.O. Okla. 1985).
58. See. e.g , Mid-Atlantic Supply, Inc. v. Three Rivers Aluminum Co., 790 F.2d 11 2 1, 11 23
(4th Cir. 1986).
59. Aic her and Fellerhoff accurately portray anoth er "factor" :
Where other fac tors are present, the courts will often discuss the language that the parties have
used in the document or agreement governing the transacti on. Courts focus on tenns s uch as
"security" or "collateral" where the other factors indi cate a loan, and on tenns such as "sale" or
"absolutely convey" where other factors su pport (or do not preclude) sale treatment. For one
court, the language in an agreement and conduct of the parties triumphed over full recourse
provisions, and the court found a sale. Most courts, however, de-emphasize the langua ge used in
a document, and consider intent and actual conduct more rel evant.
Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 194 (footnotes omitted). As we explain below, we think the
parties' expressed intention concerning the legal characterization of the transaction is by and large
irrelevant.
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narrowly focused factors-based methodologies for bringing some order
to the true sale analysis. Chief among these are Robert Aicher and
William Fellerhoff, 60 Thomas Plank, 61 and Peter Pantaleo. 62 Their
methodologies have their substantive shortcomings, which we discuss
below. 63 For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to observe that
although judicial discussions of the recharacterization issue refer to the
articles in which these methodologies appear, no court has relied on any
of these methodologies to resolve the issue. In 2008, Kenneth Kettering
advocated rejecting the factors-based approach entirely, arguing that a
purpmied true sale should be recharacterized only when necessary to
promote the purpose of recharacterization, the prevention of forfeiture. 64
Thus far, Kettering's proposal has met the same judicial fate as his
predecessors': It has been cited by the courts but not adopted.
Thus the courts' continue to rely on a recharacterization approach that
ultimately is based on their intuitive judgments about whether a given
This
transaction seems more like a sale than like a SISO.
impressionistic approach, with its inherent uncertainty, has proven
costly to parties both in and out of the securitization industry. The state
of play in the case law on the true sale-SISO issue is similar to early
case law on the lease versus security interest issue. 65 We are hopeful
that the property-based approach that we explain in Part V and that
proved successful in rationalizing the case law on recharacterization of
leases of goods will succeed likewise with respect to the
recharacterization of true sales of receivables. 66

60. Aicher & Fe llerhoff, supra note 54.
6 1. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54.
62. Peter V. Pantaleo et a!., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52
Bus . L AW. !59 ( 1996). Panta leo is identified as the "Reporter" and nine other coauthors are listed
(inc luding Thomas Plank, some of whose work we address in thi s paper). For conveni enc e our
discuss ion refers to Pantaleo as the author. We discuss in more detail our views on the role of recourse
against a seller as well as the vi ews of other observers infra.
63 . See infra Part IV.B.l.
64. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26.
As we explain infra Part IV.B.2, Kettering 's
meth odology is a clear improve ment over the facto rs-based approac hes but still has some substantive
diffi culties.
65. " [C]ou rts generall y proceed [on th e true sale issue] as they did in the earl y days of true lease
adjudication: namely, they make an intuitive judgment about th e si milarity of the transaction in question
to th e court's notion of an idea l sale (lease) or ideal secured loan (sale with retai ned sec urity interest),
based on an ad hoc se lectio n of factors that strike the cou rt as relevant in the particular case." Kettering,
True Sale, supra note 26, at 516 (citing Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under
the UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 201 ( 1988)).
66 . We are quick to acknowledge that success of this approach in the lease context was du e in no
small part to the fact that it was codifi ed in U.C.C. § l-203. However, the approach was beginning to
take hold in the case law even before codification.
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B . Commentary
Resolving the uncertainty prevailing in the case law would be a
notable accomplishment for any methodology. We offer our approach
not only with that desideratum in mind but also with the goal of
providing a method for distinguishing tme sales from SISOs on the basis
of their economic substance. To fully appreciate the substantive merits
of our approach, it will be useful to understand how it differs from the
factors-based and purposive approaches referred to above. To this end,
we describe those approaches briefly in this Part before presenting the
details of our own approach in Part V .
1. The "Factors" or "Benefits and Burdens" Approaches
Aicher and Fellerhoffs approach turns on a factor with a more
venerable past than the factors discussed above (e .g., servicing and
compromising the receivables): a material disparity between the sale
price and the value of the property purportedly sold. 67 They described
their "reasoned analytical approach to the recourse issue" as follows:
[W]hat would an informed and willing buyer pay a willing seller for a
transfer of the entire bundle of risks and benefits embodied in the cash
flow represented by the receivables? If the ultimate price that the
transferee pays, taking into account the presence of any direct and
indirect recourse provisions, is notably less than this amount, a court
should conclude that the transaction is a secured loan.
[The] analysis ... in its most basic form, inquires whether the purchaser
has paid the reasonable equivalent of a fair market price for the
receivables. The analysis permits a court to find a transaction to be a
sale, notwithstanding discounts, holdback reserves or other forms of
recourse in excess of historical default rates. Hence it is suggested that,
in applying an objective analysis to the impact that recourse should have
in the characterization of a receivables transfer, a bankruptcy court should
not take an inflexible, dollar-for-dollar approach.68
The doctrinal hook on which Aicher and Fellerhoff rely is the line of
cases holding that a deed absolute to real propertl 9 nonetheless can be
recharacterized as a mortgage securing an obligation, thus permitting the
transferor to claim a right of redemption. 70 " As a general mle these
67. Aicher & Fellerh off, supra note 54 , at 207- 10.
68 . /d. at20 7, 21 0 .
69. Unlike th e traditi o na l comm on law mo rtgage, a " deed a bso lute" con veys the real property
but co ntain s no conditi on of defeasance. G RANT S. N ELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, R EA L ESTATE
FINANC E LAW § 3.5 (5th ed. 2007).
70. "N umero us court decis ions .. . ex.ami ne whether a transfer by deed rep resents a mortgage or
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courts have found that a purchase price significantly less than the market
value of the property is highly suggestive of a mortgage." 71 Although
many cases contain statements indicating that a disparity between the
price and the value of the property conveyed is not dispositive, it
appears that such a disparity actually was dispositive in many cases. 72
Aicher and Fellerhoff recognized that no court had adopted an
approach like the one they proposed, and consequently they
recommended that transacting parties place most or all of the benefits
and burdens of ownership with the buyer (i.e., play the "factors"
game ). 73 Thomas Plank's "analytical methodology" seeks to provide
more flexibility to the parties than Aicher and Fellerhoffs play-it-safe
approach. 74
Like Aicher and Fellerhoff, Plank focuses on the
relationship between the value of the receivables and the price paid for
them. 75 A court applying Plank's approach would allow tlue sale
treatment if (i) the documents and conduct of the parties clearly indicate
that the transaction is a sale, (ii) the buyer assumes some of the burdens
of ownership or an allocation of burdens is difficult to determine, and
(iii) the buyer pays "fair value" for the receivables. 76
While Plank's methodology seems relatively straightforward, he
appreciates the inherent complexity of the analysis. For example, as
Plank explains:
There is a corollary to this rule: If the documents and the actions are
ambiguous on the characterization of the transaction, then the courts
should weigh the price paid for the property against the allocation of
burdens and benefits. If the buyer pays an amount that is in the higher
range of fair value for the property, the transaction should be
characterized as a sale if the buyer assumes a substantial portion of the
benefits and burdens, but not necessarily a preponderance. If the buyer
pays a price in the lower range, then he would need to assume a
preponderance of those benefits and burdens. If the transferee paid less
than fair value for the property, the transaction should be characterized as
a secured loan unl ess he had substantially all of the benefits and

a tru e conveyance of title. " Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 209 (citing Annotation, Valu e of
Property as Factor in Determining Wh ether Deed Was Intended as lv!ortgage, 89 A.L.R.2d I 040, I 042
( 1963) (supplementing Annotation, Value of Property as Factor in Determining Whether Deed intended
as Mortgage , 90 A.L.R. 953,954 (1934))).
71. !d.

72 . NE LSON & WHITMAN, supra no te 69, § 3.8 n.9. We explain below that even a s ignifi cant
d ispa rity between the purc hase price of receiva bles and their value is not incons istent w ith a true sale
and so s ho uld not ipso fac to compel the conclu sion th at the tran saction is a SISO. See infra Part V.B
(Examp le 5) .
73. Aicher &

Fell erh oft~

supra note 54, at 211.

74. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54, at 328.
75. Jd.at334-37.
76 . Jd.
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77

burdens .

Whether or not such ambiguity in the parties ' documents and actions
exists, Plank's impressionistic approach necessarily involves the
identification, and allocation to one party or the other, of various
burdens and benefits that seem to correlate with ownership. Moreover,
he suggests giving weight to such noneconomic factors as the parties'
accounting treatment and any descriptions of a transaction given to third
parties. 78 And, as we explain below, the relationship between the price
of receivables and their value does not deserve the prominent (even if
not determinative) role that it plays in Plank's analysis. 79
Whereas Aicher and Fellerhoff and Plank emphasize the value that a
purported buyer of receivables gives to the purported seller (i.e., the
purported price), Peter Pantaleo focuses principally on the nature of the
seller' s obligation to the buyer (i .e. , the secured obligation, if the
transaction were recharacterized). 80 Pantaleo is not the first to focus on
the seller's obligation to the buyer, which is nothing more or less than
the buyer's right of recourse against the seller. The buyer's right of
recourse against the seller has been treated as a powerful, if not
conclusive, indication that the transaction is not a true sale.81 Such
recourse may take various forms, including the seller's guaranty of the
obligations of the account debtors on the receivables or its agreement to
repurchase a receivable upon the account debtor' s default. Some
recourse arrangements contemplate that the buyer will hold back a
percentage of the sale price to be applied against defaulted receivables.
The thinking behind this emphasis on recourse against the seller seems
to be that the chief burden in respect of a receivable is the risk of the
account debtor's default and nonpayment. If the purported seller has
retained that risk, the argument goes, then the purported buyer has not
taken on an important attribute of ownership. 82
Pantaleo emphasizes the question whether the seller' s obligation has
the attributes of a borrower' s obligation to repay a loan. He draws a

77 . !d. at 329 n.l 52 .

78 . Jd. at 333 .
79 . See infra Part V. B (Example 5).
80 . Pantal eo et a!., supra note 62 .
8 1. See, e.g. , ST EVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO TH E PRINC IPLES OF
ASSET S ECUR ITI ZATION § 4 :2 (Adam D . Ford ed ., 2010) ("The most signifi cant fa cto r in the tru e sale
determination appea rs to be th e nature and extent of recourse th at the transferee of the rece iva bl es has
agai nst the transfero r."). We di scuss in m ore detail our views on the role of recourse aga inst a selle r as
well as the v iews of other o bservers elsewhere in thi s p aper. See infra Part V .B.
82 . As expla ined elsewhere, however, we are not al one in our view that th e ri ght to receive
payments from the account debtors is an even m ore sign ifi cant attri bute of ownership. See inji"a pp. 30,
4 1--42 . An d if the purported buyer has acqu ired those ri ghts to th e exclusion of the purpo rted se ll er, the
buyer mu st have become the owner regardless of its recourse against th e seller. See id.
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sharp distinction between two different types of seller recourse
obligations in this respect.
The first type is "[ r ]ecourse for
collectibility," which he describes as "the equivalent of warranting that
the asset will perform in accordance with its terms." 83 Collectibility
recourse could take forms such as a guaranty of the assigned receivables
or an obligation to repurchase a receivable in the case of default.
Because this recourse derives from the qualities of the assets being sold,
it is akin to warranties of quality that typically accompany sales of other
types of property, such as goods. 84 According to Pantaleo, such
recourse is consistent with true sale treatment and not indicative of a
loan. 85
Pantaleo identifies a second type of recourse as "economic recourse."
He explains that "[ e]conomic recourse is the equivalent of warranting a
return to the buyer of its investment [the putative sales price] plus an
agreed upon yield unrelated to the asset's payment terms." 86 Economic
recourse "goes beyond the quality of the asset and ensures an economic
rate of return to the purported buyer that is unrelated to the payment
terms of the underlying asset . . . ." 87 Pantaleo argues that economic
recourse demonstrates that the "underlying asset ... serves merely as
collateral and the transaction is susceptible to being recharacterized as a
loan. " 88 We are skeptical of this approach. 89
Aicher and Fellerhoff, Plank, and Panteleo sought to bring some order
from chaos, but none adequately identifies exactly what it is that
distinguishes a true sale from a SISO. Rather, each adopts the
conventional approach of analyzing whether and to what extent the
purported buyer has succeeded to and assumed the "benefits and
burdens" of ownership. Each also denounces the approach of many
courts looking to various "factors" and assessing whether overall the
transaction "seems" more like a sale than a secured loan. Instead, each
claims to have discovered a more coherent approach for the
characterization puzzle. But each ultimately embraces some f.0rm of the
"factors" approach, even if implicitly and grudgingly. 90

83. Pantaleo et al., supra note 62, at 163.
84. E.g. , U.C.C. § 2-314(a) (providing that a warranty that goods are merchantable is ordinarily
implied in a contract for their sale).
85. Pantaleo et al., supra note 62, at 171. We agree, as do others such as Kettering. Kettering,
Tru e Sole, supra note 26, at 542-43.
86. Pantaleo et al., supra note 62, at 163.
87. !d.
88. Jd
89. See infi"a Part V.
90. Aicher and Fellerhoff recommend structuring transactions with an eye to the risks and
benefits of ownership. Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 211. Plank's formula also involves
weighing the benefits and burdens of ownership. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54, at 328-30.

- · -~-
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2. Kettering ' s "Purposive Analysis"
Kettering rej ects the factors-based approaches of Aicher and
Fellerhoff, Plank, and Pantaleo as "offer[ing] little more than their own
intuitive notions of sale and secured loan." 9 1 He offers instead a
"purposive analysis." Recharacterization, he claims, is an antiforfeiture
doctrine. 92 The sole purpose of recharacterizing a sale of receivables as
a SISO is to protect the purported seller from suffering a forfeiture in the
event the seller fails to perform as contemplated by the parties. 93 One
should recharacterize a purported sale of receivables as a SISO only
when recharacterization is necessary to accomplish this purpose. 94
Under Kettering's purposive approach, the decision whether to
recharacterize is based on the consequences of the decision rather than
an intuitive sense of whether the transaction seems more like a sale or
more like a SISO. Such an approach may yield more predictable results
than the factors-based approaches it rejects. 95 We think the results that
Kettering reaches are for the most part correct. 96 We also agree that the
purposes and policies underlying Article 9 have some bearing on the
recharacterization decision 97 and that these purposes and policies may
differ from those applicable in other settings where the distinction must
be drawn, such as when construing the tax and usury laws. 98
Nevertheless, our approach is fundamentally different from
Kettering's. Kettering argues that the "purpose" of recharacterization
"should determine the circumstances in which recharacterization is
appropriate." 99
According to Kettering, "a sale should be
recharacterized as a secured loan if the result otherwise would be an
arrangement in which the seller is at risk of suffering a forfeiture in the
Pantaleo' s focu s on the nature of recourse--collectibility or economic-appears to in voke th e idea th at
economic recourse possesses the characteristics typical of a loan. Pantaleo et al. , supra note 62, at 17 1.
91 . Kettering, Tnte Sa le, supra note 26, at 51 6 .
92. !d. at 53 1.
93. !d. at 512 C'[N]othing in Article 9 of the UCC al ters the historical purpose of
rec haracteri za ti on . .. ."); id. at 539 (discussing other poss ible purpos es for rec haracterization and
concluding that "nothing in the stmcture of Article 9 . .. prov ides a good reason for recharacteri za ti on
of a sale of receivables to be governed by a standard different from the antiforfeiture principle from
which th e doctrine evolved").
94. !d . at 526 ("Analys is should begin by askin g th e purpose of recharacteri zation, and that
purpose should determine th e circumstances in which recharacterization is appropriate.") .
95 . Th is is not to suggest that the approach does not require the exercise of judgment; it does. !d.
at 530-3 1 (ex plaining that th e principle for recharacterizing calls for judgments of probability and
estimates of va lue).
96 . See infra Part V.
97. See U.C.C. § l-1 03(a) (providing th at "[The Unifo rm Commercial Code) must be liberall y
constmed and applied to promote its underl ying purposes and policies .... ").
98. See Ketterin g, True Sale, supra note 26, at 546.
99. !d.
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event that he fails to perform a contemplated act." 100 We think that
Kettering has it backwards. The reason a sale must be recharacterized
as a SISO is because the "seller" retained an interest in the receivables
that secures an obligation, and consequently the transaction is the
functional and economic equivalent of a SIS0. 101 Protection against
forfeiture is a consequence of-and not the reason for-the
recharacterization. And recharacterization of a purported sale may be
appropriate even when the terms of the transaction would not result in a
forfeiture. 102
Consider, for example, the simplest sale of a receivable imaginable: a
nonrecourse sale for an up-front cash price and with the seller retaining
no rights, control, or interest in the receivable and no direct or indirect
benefits of, or other connection with, the receivable after the sale. Then
consider an explicit srso transaction involving a debtor's grant of a
security interest to secure its debt to a secured party (which implicitly
incorporates the concept imposed by law that the security interest
vanishes upon satisfaction of the debt). Is the former a true sale and the
latter a srso because it is necessary to protect the debtor's equity of
redemption in the latter and not in the former? Certainly not. Article 9
treats them differently because of the economic substance of the
transactions are different. The debtor's equity of redemption is
protected in the latter because it is a SISO. It is not a SISO because it is
necessary to protect the debtor's equity of redemption. The application
of Article 9 turns on the characterization of the transaction.
V. A PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH TO DISTINGUISHING A TRUE SALE
FROM A SISQ

A. Building on the Lease Versus SISO Analysis
As we have noted, Article 9 does not define the terms "sale" and
''security interest that secures an obligation," even though it draws
important distinctions between them. 103 To a considerable extent,
Kettering's approach to recharacterization of a purported true sale of
receivables, under which a transaction is recharacterized only when
necessary to achieve a desired result (prevention of forfeiture),
eliminates any need to define these terms or otherwise imbue them with
content outside the forfeiture context. 104 We think that these terms,
I 00. Jd. at 531.
I 0 l. See infra notes l 06-116 and accompanying text.
I 02. See infra Part V. B (Example I).
I 03. See supra notes 40-43.
104. Kettering's approach requires one to recharacterize a transaction in order to protect the
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although undefined, have content, that their content reflects the
functional and economic substance of the transactions they
encompass, 105 and that Article 9 distinguishes between the two concepts
on the basis of their substance. The substance of the transactions, in
tum, depends on the functional and economic attributes of the property
interests that the purported buyer and purported seller enjoy after the
purported sale occurs.
In our view, a transaction should be
recharacterized as a SISO if the interest transferred to the purported
buyer is in fact not the functional and economic equivalent of ownership
but rather the functional and economic equivalent of a security interest
that secures an obligation.
How, then, can one determine whether a transferee of receivables
acquires an interest that is the functional and economic equivalent of
ownership, in which case the purported sale would not be
recharacterized, or of a SISO, in which case recharacterization would be
dictated? Fortunately, we need not reinvent the wheel. Courts must
make the same determination, i.e. , whether a transferee acquires an
interest that is the functional and economic equivalent of ownership,
when distinguishing a true lease of goods from a purported lease that
creates a SIS0. 106 The proper characterization of a purported lease of
goods has been the subject of a considerable amount of thoughtful
analysis, the best of which was incorporated into UCC Article 1. 107 By
bringing to bear the experience and learning with respect to the
characterization of purported leases, one can "solve" the
recharacterization problem with respect to purported sales of
receivables.
When the parties enter into a purported lease of goods, the purported
lessor is the owner of the goods . If the transaction is a true lease, the
purported seller from the risk of suffering a forfe iture fo r failing to make a contemplated perfonnance.
But. in our view, before one can protect th e seller from this risk, one must determine whether the sell er
has retained an interes t in the recei vables, whether th e parties contemplate a tuture perfom1ance, and
\vhether the seller' s interes t would be forfeited if perfmmance is not fo rthc oming.
105. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(l) (Article 9 applies to "a transaction , regardless of its form , that
creates a sec urity interes t in personal property or fi xtures by contract"). See also id. § 1-203 cmt. 2
(explaining that subsecti on (b), whi ch sets fort h circumstances where a transacti on in th e form of a lease
creates a security interest, "focus[ es] on economics").
106. Kettering has noted that the state of play in the case law on the true sale issue is similar to
ea rly case law on the lease versus security interest issue. "[C]ourts generall y proceed [on the true sa le
issue] as they did in the early days of true lease adjudication: name ly, they make an intuitive judgment
about the similarity of the transacti on in questi on to th e court 's notion of an ideal sale (lease) or ideal
sec ured loan (sale with retained security inte rest), based on an ad hoc selection of factors that strike the
co urt as relevant in the pa11icular case." Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 516 (citing Cooper,
supra note 65, at 20 I).
107. U.C.C . § 1-203 (di stinguishin g a lease from a security interest). For an overview of these
provisions as they app eared in former Article l, see Steven L. Harris, The lnteljace Between Articles 2A
and 9 Under the Official Text and the California Amendments, 22 UCC L.J. 99, 101-110 ( 1989).
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lease contract affords to each party a leasehold interest in the goods.
The lessee acquires the right to possession and use of the goods for the
term of the lease, subject to the right of the lessor to recover the goods in
the event that the lessee defaults on rental or other obligations. 108 In
addition, the lessor retains a residual interest in the goods, i.e., an
"interest in the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the
lease contract." 109 Put otherwise, the lessor remains the owner of the
goods, subject to the lessee's leasehold interest.
The legal issue surrounding characterization usually is cast as
follows: should the interest retained by the purported lessor be
recharacterized as a security interest? Because the right to recover the
goods upon default is consistent with both a true lease and a SISO, the
answer turns in large part on whether the transaction is structured so
that, at the end of the lease term, the purported lessor will enjoy a
"meaningful" residual interest. 11 0 If the transaction is structured in such
a way that, when the parties enter into it, the lessor reasonably expects
to recover the goods and that the goods will have economic value in
excess of scrap, the lease will not be recharacterized. Rather, the law
will give effect to the parties' characterization and treat the lessor, who
is expected to retain a meaningful residual interest in the goods, as the
owner; the lessee will hold only a leasehold interest. Article 2A, and not
Article 9, will govern the rights of the parties on the lessee's default. Its
remedial scheme allocates to the owner-lessor any unexpected increase
or decrease in the residual value of the goods. 111
On the other hand, if the transaction is structured in such a way that,
when the parties enter into it, the lessor does not reasonably expect to
recover the goods unless the lessee fails to pay the purchase price (rent),
then the "lessee" can be expected to enjoy the functional and economic
equivalent of ownership. Under these circumstances, the "lessor"-as
an economic, and therefore as a legal, matter- holds a security interest
in the goods and not a residual ownership interest. Regardless of
whether the parties subjectively intended to enter into a lease and not a
secured transaction, and regardless of the label they applied to the
transaction, the "lessor" is an Article 9 secured party and the "lessee" is

I 08. :J.C.C . § 2A-l 03(l)(m) (defining "leasehold interest").
I 09. !d. § 2A-I 03( 1)( q) (detinin g "lessor' s residual interest").
1 10. This is the up shot of the tests provided in U.C.C . § l-203(b ).
111. See U.C.C. § 2A-527(2); id. § 2A-528(1). Stripped to their essentials, these sections limit a
defaulting lessee's liability for damages to (i) past due rent, (ii) the difference between the present value
of the lessee's rental obligation for the remainder of the lease tem1 and the present value of the market
rent for that term, and (i ii) incidental damages less expenses saved by th e lessor in consequence of the
default. So if, for example, th e lessee defau Its and the lessor repossesses and sells the goods, the
lessee's liability is unaffected by the amount of the purchase price.
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the owner and an Article 9 debtor. 11 2 Article 9's remedial scheme
applies, not Article 2A' s. Article 9 protects the "lessee's" (debtor's)
ownership by affording the "lessee" a nonwaivable right to redeem the
collateral (the "leased" goods) and a nonwaivable right to recover any
surplus proceeds of a foreclosure sale or other disposition. 11 3
The analysis of a purported true sale of receivables is the minor
image of the true lease analysis. In the case of a purported sale of
receivables, when the parties enter into the transaction the seller is the
owner of the receivables. The parties agree that ownership is conveyed
to the buyer. If in fact the buyer acquires the functional and economic
equivalent of ownership, then the sale is a true sale and Article 9 affords
no redemption rights to the seller. But if the buyer acquires only a
limited interest, i.e., if the seller has not transfened all of its interest in
the "sold" receivables, then the transaction should be recharacterized. 114
To summarize, in a recharacterized sale of receivables, the initial
owner of the collateral is the seller-debtor that is transfening a security
interest to the buyer-secured party. In a recharacterized lease of goods,
the initial owner of the goods is the lessor-secured party that is selling
the goods to the lessee-debtor and retaining a security interest. In the
former context, the exercise is to determine whether the "seller"
transfened all of its interest to the "buyer" or whether it transfened only
a security interest and retained some interest. In the latter context, the
goal is to determine whether the "lessor" transfened all of its interest in
the goods to the "lessee," retaining only a security interest, or whether
the lessor retained a residual interest in the goods upon termination or
completion of the lease term.
Consider another perspective: one might address the characterization
issue with respect to both leases of goods and sales of receivables by
focusing on whether the original owner (lessor or seller) has conveyed to
the transferee (lessee or buyer)-and whether the transferee has
acquired-the functional and economic equivalent of ownership. If the
answer is "yes," then the lease will be recharacterized as a secured sale

112. As the offic ial comments explain:
When a security interest is created, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction
or the name that parties have given to it. Likewise, the subjective intention of the parties with
respect to the legal characterization of their transaction is irrelevant to whether this Article
applies ....
U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 2 (20 10).
11 3. See id. § 9-623 (affording a debtor the right to redeem collateral); id. § 9-615(d) (affording a
debtor a rignl to payment of any surplus); id. § 9-602(4), (II) (providing that a debtor may not waive or
vary the rules stated in §§ 9-623 and 9-615(d)).
114. Cf Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 533 ("[W)hen the parties to a conveyance of a
receivable refer to it as a 'sale,' they normally intend that the seller is transferring to the buyer all of the
seller's rights in the receivable .... ").
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(SISO) but the sale of receivables will not be recharacterized. If the
answer is "no," then the lease of goods will not be recharacterized but
the sale of receivables will be. Alternatively, one might conduct the
equivalent analysis by focusing on what the transferor retained. If the
lessor retained the functional and economic equivalent of ownership,
then the transaction is a true lease. If the seller of receivables retained
such an interest, then the transaction is not a true sale. This analysis is
reflected in Table 1.
Table 1
True Lease of Goods
Lessor retains ownership
Lessee acquires limited interest
(leasehold)

True Sale of Receivables
Seller retains no interest
Buyer acquires ownership

Lease Recharacterization as SISO

Sale of Receivables Recharacterized
as SISO

"Lessor" retains limited interest
(SISO)

"Seller" retains ownership

"Lessee" acquires ownership

"Buyer" acquires limited interest
(SISO)

As the foregoing suggests, the purported seller's retention of an
interest in receivables that have been "sold" is an essential component of
a SISO. Stated otherwise, for a SISO to arise, the "seller" must not have
transferred all of its interest in the receivables. Of course, not every
interest retained by a "seller" of receivables is a SISO. By definition,
for a SISO to arise there must also be an obligation that is secured by the
transferred receivables. 115 In the present context, this normally would
mean that there must be an obligation of the purported seller to the
purported buyer of the receivables that is secured by the receivables.
The transfer of receivables from the seller to the buyer cannot be a SISO
unless such a secured obligation can be identified. 11 6
11 5. U.C.C . § l-20 1(b)(35) ('"Sec mity interest' means an interest in perso nal property or fix tures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation .").
11 6. The existence of a secured obligation also plays an important role in distingui shing leases
from sec uri ty interests. It has long been understood that a lease with a nomin al purchase option may be
a true lease nevertheless if the lease is terminable by the lessee. In that case there may be no meaningful
obligati on suffic ient to support a SJSO characterization. Thi s is the point of a problem in our casebook
based on the in fa mous case of In re Royer's Bake1y, inc., I UCC Rep. Serv . 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963).
STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, J R., SECURITY INTERES TS IN P ERSONAL PROPERTY 318-19
(Problem 5.1.2), 324 (Note (3) on The Importance of th e Lessee's Contractua l Obligati on) (5 th ed.
20 II); see also Peter F. Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unco nventional Security
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Of course, the lease- SISO and the true sale- SISO analyses are not
identical, and we do not claim that they are or should be. Rather, our
claim is that various components of the lease- SISO analysis are
applicable and instructive in the true sale- SISO analysis. In each case,
the goal-to ascertain the economic substance of the transaction-is the
same. So are many of the consequences of recharacterization. Just as
when a purported lease is recharacterized as a SISO the ownership
interest of the purported lessee is entitled to the benefits of Article 9' s
antiforfeiture provisions, so when a purported sale of receivables is
recharacterized the ownership interest of the purported seller is entitled
to those same protections. 117 And just as when a purported lease is
recharacterized the resulting security interest is at risk unless it is
perfected, the same consequences follow when a purported sale is
recharacterized and the resulting security interest is unperfected. 118
Inasmuch as the purpose and effect of each recharacterization is to
determine whether the provisions of Article 9 governing SISOs apply to
the transaction in question, we think it makes perfect sense in the saleof-receivables context to use the economic-substance analysis that has
proven so successful in the leasing context.
It is true that the principal non bankruptcy effect of recharacterizing a
purported lease as a SISO is to subject it to the Article 9 filing rules,
whereas in most cases sales of receivables are already subject to the
filing rules. 119 But it does not follow from the differences in principal
effects that differing methodologies are appropriate for determining
whether a transaction is a SISO. The effects of the recharacterization of
sales of receivables and leases flow from the terms of Article 9. The
purpose and effect of either recharacterization is to apply to the
transaction the rules of Article 9 applicable to a SISO.
In determining whether those rules would apply to a purported lease,
Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201 (37) and Article 9, 1973 D UK E L.J. 909 , 91 8, 923- 27 , 932 42 (di sc ussing the sign ificance of a purported lessee' s obligation to pay an amount equi valent to the
purchase pri ce). It is also the reason why a lease will not be recharacteri zed as a SISO under th e " per
se" rul es of U. C. C. § l-203(b) unless the consideration to be paid to lessor is the lessee' s "o bligat ion for
the term of the lease" and is " not subject to termination by the lessee .... " U.C .C. § l-203( b).
117. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(l) (providing for a nonwaivable right to any surplus of a
di sposition after default). There is, of course, a difference in the applica ble remedial scheme if these
transactions are not recharacteri zed. The true lessor of goods will enjoy the rem edies under Arti c le 2A
if the lessee breaches th e terms of the lease, see supra note Ill , whereas the true bu yer may have no
statutory remed y against the seller because the bu yer may have no obligation to the selle r. See U.C.C.
§ 9-6!5(e) lprovidin g that if th e underl ying tran saction is the sale of receivables, there is no liability for
a defici ency); see also supra note 32 (ex plaining that "obligor" should read "seller") .
11 8. See, e.g., U. C .C. § 9-3 17(a) (providing that an unperfected securi ty interest gen era lly is
subordinate to a subsequent judicial lien creditor). Recharacterization 1vould affect perfecti on with
respect to payment intangibles and promissory notes but not accounts and chattel paper. See also in/i-a
note 152.
I 19. Exceptions are sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes.
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section 1-203 follows the case law that focused on the economic
realities of the transaction, i.e., whether the "lessee" agreed to acquire
and pay for, and whether the "lessor" agreed to part with, essentially the
The recharacterization
entire economic value of the goods.
methodology was not developed by examining a transaction, asking
whether public notice by way of an Article 9 filing should be required
for the transaction, and recharacterizing the transaction in the case of an
affirmative answer. The filing requirement for leases recharacterized as
SISOs was simply one of several results, albeit a very important one,
that followed from the recharacterization. 120
Our methodology is not only sound but also useful. For example,
lessons from the leasing cases and literature are instructive in identifying
the relevance, if any, of recourse to the proper characterization of a

120. Of course, the applicab ility of the filing rules is not the only material nonbank.ruptcy effect of
recharacterizing a lease as a SISO. Consider a nonterminab le lease of equipment valued at $ 1,000, with
an anticipated economic life of ten years, for an initial term of three years at an annual rental of $350,
payable monthly. The anticipated fair market value of the equipment at the end of the initial term will
be S700. Following the initial tenn, Lessee has an option to renew annually, for an additional seven
years, for an annual rental of $5. Assume that Lessee defaults after makin g the first 18 monthly rental
payments and Lessor takes possession of the equipment. Lessor claims damages in the amount of the
present value of the remaining (initial-term) rental payments ($525) less the present value of the market
rent for the remaining portion of the initial term.
If the lease is not recharacteri zed as a SJSO, then Article 2A wou ld apply. Lessor wou ld be
en titled to retain the equipment and recover the dam ages claimed. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(1 ). If,
however, the lease is recharacterized (as it should be, given the nominal renewal opti ons that extend
through th e remain ing economic life of the equipment, see id. § 1-203(b)(3)), then Article 9, Part 6
wo uld apply. In the normal case, Lessor (as a secured party, in the role of either a seller of goods or a
lender of funds) would not be entitled to retain the equipment but would be obliged to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, credit the net proceeds of disposition agai nst Lessee's
obli gation , and pay any surplus to Lessee. !d.§§ 9-6 10, 9-615. In effect, the failure to recharacterize
\vo uld cause Lessee to forfei t the residual value, for which it bargained.
It is inconceivable to us that a court astute enough to recognize that Lessor is not entitled to
any meaningful residua l value (i.e., would give Lessee the benefit of its bargain and limit Lessor's
recovery to lost rent), perhaps relying on U.C.C. § l-305(a), nevertheless wou ld fail to recharacterize the
lease as a SISO. The only plausible explanation for a court's fail ure to recharacterize the lease as a
SISO -vvould be that the court failed to recognize the basis for recharacterization (the nom inal renewal
options). Having fa iled to recharacterize the lease, the court wou ld apply Article 2A to the breach that
occurred during the initial three-year term of the true lease.
Recharacterization also may have material economic consequen ces even in the simple case in
wh ich the initial term (say, ten years) of a non terminab le lease is equal to the anticipated economic life
of the goods . The actual usefu l life of th e goods may tum out to exceed expectations, and the fair rental
va lue of the goods at the time of Lessee's default may exceed the rent due under the lease. Suppose that
Lessee repudiates at the end of year three and returns the equipment to Lessor. Lessor then enters into a
substitute lease of the goods for the remaining seven years at a hi ghe r rent than Lessee had agreed to
pay. The economic substance of the transaction is that Lessee bargained to become the owner of the
goods. As such, Lessee should be entitled to credit for the entire va lue of the goods (as reflected by the
present va lue of the rent payable under the substitute lease and the va lue, if any, of the residual), less the
ob li gation deemed secured by the goods. Because this transaction must be recharacterized as a SISO,
under Artic le 9 Lessee would be entitled to the present value of the rentals, to the extent that th ey exceed
the secured obligation and related expenses and attorney's fees. See id. § 9-615(d)(l).
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transaction in receivables. As we have explained, the ove:arching role
of recourse in the case law and literature on the true sale Issue may be
understood best from the perspective of the courts ' attempt to allocate
12 1
and measure the benefits and burdens of ownership.
Seen from that
narrow perspective alone, the seller's retention of the credit risk of
account debtor nonperformance seems significant, if not determinative.
The risk of nonpayment is the principal risk of owning a receivable.
In the lease context, however, commentators and courts have come to
accept that a factors-type "benefits and burdens" focus on what may
seem to be owner-type responsibilities or risks sheds little, if any, light
on the analysis. 122 For example, placing contractual responsibility on a
lessee for the payment of taxes, insurance, and other obligations and
expenses relating to the leased goods has little or nothing to do with
whether a purported lease should be recharacterized as a SIS0. 123 Much
of the case law on recharacterizing purported leases as secured
transactions, during the 1960s and 1970s in particular, took a factors
approach. By the 1980s, much of the case law was appropriately
focusing on the economic realities of the transaction and whether a
purported lessor had effectively retained a meaningful residual interest
at the expiration of the lease term. 124 If so, true lease treatment was
appropriate. The more rigorous analysis in these cases was inspired in
part by a growing and more sophisticated academic literature. 125 The
resulting analytical structure was codified in a revised definition of
"security interest" promulgated in 1987 along with Article 2A. 126
The analogous case law and literature on the tme sale- SISO 1ssue,
121. See supra Part IV .A- B.
122. Cooper, sup ra note 65, at 201, 222, 230--3 1.
123. /d. at 230.
124. See U .C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 2.
125. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Furth er Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARI Z. ST. L.J. 341
(1983); John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of !he Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. R EV . 667 (1983) ;
Amelia H. Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B. U. L. R EV. 39 (1984) ; Amelia H.
Boss, Leases & Sales: Ne'er or Where Shall The Twain }v/eef?, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35 7 (1 983 ); Peter F.
Cooga n, is There a Difference Belween A Long-Term Lease and an !nsta//menl Sale of Personal
Property?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1036 (198 1); Coogan, supra note 116; Cooper, supra note 65; Cha rl es W.
Mooney, Jr. , Personal Property Leasing : A Challenge, 36 Bus . LAW. 1605 ( 198 1).
126. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37) (1987). ln connection with the revis ion of Article I in 200 1, the
provisions in the definition of "security interest" relatin g to di stin guishing leases from sec urity interests
were moved to a new§ 1-203. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001). Until it was revised in connec ti on with the
promulgation of Article 2A, the UCC 's definition of "security interest" provided, in pettinent part,
"[u]nless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title th ereunder is not a ' security
interest' . ... Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of eac h case .... "
U.C.C. § 1-20 1(37) (1962). Some courts misconstrued the phrase " intended as sec urity'' as requiring
them to characterize the transaction as a lease or security interest in accordance with th e parties'
subjecti ve inten tions as to the legal characterization. The proper approach is to detem1ine th e terms of
the parties' agreement and then to consider the nature of the transaction as a matter of economic
substance . See U.C.C. § I -203 cmt. 2 (referring to the "foc us on economics").
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however, has failed to mature analytically. It generally focuses on the
existence of recourse against the seller coupled with other factors
claimed to represent indicia of ownership, such as whether a purported
seller or buyer has responsibility for servicing and collecting the
receivables. This approach fails to appreciate and rigorously analyze the
actual economic relationships. These "factors" generally should be
discounted and disregarded except in respect of their actual economic
impact or as they may be useful for determining the terms of the
relevant agreement.
Thus we see two very different alternative approaches to comparing
the terms of a purported sale of receivables to the characteristics of a
SISO, particularly as regards the role of recourse. One approach,
advocated by Pantaleo, focuses primarily on the question whether a
seller's recourse has the attributes of a borrower's obligation to repay a
loan. If economic recourse (as opposed to collectibility recourse) exists,
Pantaleo would find a SISO transaction. But this emphasis on the "loanlike" terms of a seller's recourse obligation appears to give great
significance to the parties' subjective intentions with respect to the legal
characterization of the transaction. Moreover, the seller's economic
recourse, its guaranty of the buyer's yield, is offset by the price paid or
to be paid by the buyer. Taken together, the guarantee and the price
determine the net value that the seller will receive in exchange for the
receivables. In our view, the nature and calculation of the net sales price
do not provide an adequate basis for recharacterization.
We favor a second general approach to comparing the terms of a
purported sale transaction with the characteristics of a SISO. This
approach recognizes that in a SISO transaction the purported seller will
retain some economic interest in the receivables to secure an obligation
of the purported buyer. Stated otherwise, it recognizes that in a true sale
the buyer will have captured all of the value of the receivables, leaving
none for the seller. But these conclusory descriptions do not alone
provide sufficient guidance. For that reason Part V.B provides examples
that illustrate these concepts of a retained interest and a secured
obligation.
As to a putative buyer's secured obligation, once again, the leasing
cases and literature are instructive. As we explained above, a purported
lessee's obligation is an essential element ofrecharacterizing a lease as a
SISO transaction. 127 But the law on lease recharacterization, now
codified, recognizes that such an obligation (as in a "full-payout" lease)
is of itself an insufficient basis for recharacterization if the lessor in fact

!27. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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128

retains a meaningful residual interest.
The lessee 's obligation may
have all the earmarks of an installment purchase price, but if the lessee
does not acquire all of the lessor's interest, the transaction is a true lease.
The same holds true in the receivables context. As we shall see in the
examples that follow, a seller's recourse obligation may be an important,
indeed necessary, element of a recharacterization, but it is not a
sufficient basis on which to conclude that a transaction is a SIS0. 129
This is so even if a recourse obligation is accompanied in the transaction
by various other "indicia of ownership" thought to be probative
"factors" in the true sale analysis. This analysis reveals the flaw in
Pantaleo's argument that a loan repayment-like recourse obligationeconomic recourse--dictates SISO treatment. A seller's recourse
obligation in an amount equivalent to repayment of the sales price with
interest should not dictate SISO treatment if the seller has not retained a
meaningful economic interest in the receivables. 130
The features of a SISO are commonly known and understood.
Holding up a purported sale transaction against the SISO template is
more likely to yield an appropriate result than using what one imagines
are the characteristics of a sale as a template. Virtually all of the
commentary on the subject recognizes that attempts to sort out whether,
and the extent to which, the benefits and burdens of ownership have
passed to a purported buyer are problematic at best. 13 1
Even with the approach we advocate, distinguishing a true sale of
receivables from a SISO may not be easy. Indeed, determining whether
the purported seller of receivables has retained some interest in the
receivables after sale often is more difficult than determining whether
the purported lessor of goods has retained an interest. In lease
transactions, the terms of the transaction documents invariably provide
that the purported lessor retains a leasehold interest and a residual
interest in the leased goods. The legal question is whether the economic
nature of the retained interests is such that the law should recharacterize
them as a security interest. In receivables transactions, however, an
interest retained by the seller may not be expressly reflected by the
contractual terms of the transaction documents . That is to say, the
documentation may provide in its form and terminology for the transfer
of all of the seller's interest and may not provide- by its terms-for the
seller to retain any residual, reversion, or other beneficial "equity''

128. U.C.C . § l-203(c)(l); id. § 1-203 cmt. 2.
129. See infra Part V.B.
130. Of course, one can't he lp but wonder why a sophisticated seller would agree to be liable for
an amount equivalent to the sales price plus interest without als o reta ining some interest in the so ld
receivables. We di scuss thi s apparentl y implausi ble situation infra.
13 l. See, e.g. , Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 516.
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interest. But if the transfer is functionally and economically a SISO,
then the "seller" is an Article 9 debtor who enjoys a right to redeem the
collateral (the "sold" receivables), even if the transfer by its terms
purports to be absolute.
In attempting to fashion a method for distinguishing a true sale of
receivables from a SISO, some commentators have sought guidance
from the large body of case law that addresses the same issue with
respect to real property, i.e., whether a deed absolute on its face should
be recharacterized as a conveyance for security (in effect, a
mortgage). 132 Although real property recharacterization law is not
completely consistent, section 3.2 of the Restatement Third, Property
(Mortgage~) is sufficient for present purposes. In setting out what the
Repmiers describe as "the majority view that the intent of the parties,
and not the form of the transaction, controls," 133 that section provides, in
pertinent part:
§ 3.2 The Absolute Deed Intended as Security
(a) Parol evidence is admissible to establish that a deed purporting to be
an absolute conveyance of real estate was intended to serve as
security for an obligation, and should therefore be deemed a
mortgage. The obligation may have been created prior to or
contemporaneous with the conveyance and need not be the personal
liability of any person.
(b) Intent that the deed serve as security must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Such intent may be inferred from the totality of
the circumstances, including the following factors:
( 1) statements of the parties;
(2) the presence of a substantial disparity between the value received
by the grantor and the fair market value of the real estate at the
time of the conveyance;
(3) the fact that the grantor retained possession of the real estate;
(4) the fact that the grantor continued to pay real estate taxes ;
(5) the fact that the grantor made post-conveyance improvements to
the real estate; and
(6) the nature of the parties and their relationship prior to and after the

132. Aicher and Fellerhoff re lied on that case law to buttress their argument that the touchstone of
the analys is should be the existence of a material disparity between the value of th e receivables and the
pri ce paid for them. Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 207--09 . Plank pointed out that the
recharacterization law was well settled in the real property context, but other than giving central
sign ificance to a material di sparity between the sales price and the va lue, his analys is does not apply real
property doctrine directly. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54, at 288- 89. Kettering argued th at courts
sho uld be paying more attention to that law, which direc tly addresses the policy th at recharacteri zation
seeks to promote: insuring that the mortgagor does not forfeit any equity it may enjoy in the real
property. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 526-31.
133. RESTATEJv!ENTTH!RD, PROPERTY(MORTGAG ES) § 3.2 reporters ' note ( 1997) .
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134

Couched in terms of what a conveyance was "intended" to achieve
and listing "factors" from which "intent may be inferred," section 3.2
seems to embody the very attributes that were rejected in the UCC' s
reformed approach toward the lease- security interest dichotomy.
Properly understood, however, there is no contradiction.
The
Restatement rule faithfully reflects the language used by courts over
many years. 135 But the comments suggest that the point of the exercise
is to ascertain the terms of the agreement between the parties, i.e ., what
the parties intended the deal between them to be. Recharacterization
requires terms that amount to a mortgage securing an obligation. For
example, was it the deal that the recipient of the conveyance would
reconvey the property to the transferor upon satisfaction of an obligation
owed by the transferor? Or, was the agreement the economic equivalent
of such a deal? In either case the transaction is for security and should
be recharacterized as a mortgage. If not, then the absolute conveyance
should stand. 136
134. !d. For Kettering's discuss ion of rec haracterization in thi s setting, including under the
Restatement, see Ketterin g, Tme Sale, supra note 26, at 527-31. Restatement section 3.3 IS
substanti ally similar. As exp lained in comment a:
Section 3.2 deals with situations in which parol evidence is used to establish that an abso lute
deed was intended as sec urity for an obligation, or in which the security intent is refl ec ted in a
separate writing. The present section dea ls with absolute deed transactions in which there is a
second written document that purports to confer on the grantor either the opti on (Illustrati ons 1-3
and 5-6) or th e contractual obligation (Illustration 4) to purchase the property described in the
deed. This type of transaction is often referred to as a conditional sale.
RESTATEMENT THIRD, PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 3.3 cmt. a.
135. Recall that, un ti l the promulgation of Article 2A, the UCC used the phrase "intended as
security" with respect to the recharacteriza tion of a true lease. See supra note 125. The phrase also
appea red in Former Article 9. U.C.C. §§ 9-1 02(2), 9-408 (1962).
136. Kettering 's perspective is con sistent with this characterization:
[T]he Restatement glosses [the rule in section 3.3, whi ch co ntemplates recharacterizati on when
an absolute conveyance was intended by the parties as sec urity] in a way that implements th e
ant iforfeiture principl e . ... That is, the sa le w ill be recharacterized if th e tra nsaction am ounts to
imposition of a forfeiture upon the gra ntor in the event that th e grantor fai ls in a contempl ated
perform ance. Specitlcally, if the economic terrns of th e transaction are suc h as to make it c lea r
at th e outset that th e grantor will repurchase the property if he is able to do so, then th e sa le will
be recharacterized, for the grantor suffers th e economic equivalent of strict foreclosure by not
ca rrying out the contempl ated repurchase .
Ketterin g, True Sale, supra note 26, at 529- 30. These observati ons apply equally to the rule
in section 3.2.
We recognize that not everyone agrees with the Restatement's gloss. See. e.g., Marshall E.
Tracht, Leasehold Recharacterization in Bankruptcy: A Review and Critique (N.Y. Law Sch. Legal
Stud. Res. Paper No. 12/ 13 #42), available at http://ssm. com/abstract=2097 105 (findin g merit in the
cases th at characterize a transaction in accordance with th e subj ecti ve intent of the parti es as to the lega l
etTect or form of their transaction and criticizing th ose that adopt th e "economic reality" approach).
Under the UCC, however, " [t]he subjective intenti on of the parties with respect to the legal
characterization of their transaction is irrelevant" to wh ether a transaction gives rise to a "sec urity
interest" governed by Art icle 9. U.C.C. § 9-1 09 cmt. 2.
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The factors usefully come into play when the evidence is conflicting
as to the tenns of the parties' agreement. Consider section 3.2,
illustration 3:
3. Grantor conveys Blackacre to Grantee by a deed that contains no
language of defeasance. Grantee pays Grantor $25,000 in cash, but
Grantor does not deliver a promissory note to Grantee. Grantor testifies
that Grantee promised orally to reconvey Blackacre to grantor upon the
latter's payment of $35,000 to Grantee two years thereafter. Grantee
denies making such an oral promise and contends that the transaction
constitutes a sale of Blackacre to Grantee.
Grantor has retained
possession and has continued to pay the real estate taxes on Blackacre.
At the time of the conveyance the fair market value of Blackacre is
$50,000. The facts justify the conclusion that the parties intended a
.
.
13'1
secunty transactiOn.

The factors in illustration 3- the disparity between the consideration
paid and value of the property conveyed and the grantor's continued
possession and payment of real estate taxes- provide cogent evidence
of whose testimony should be believed. In illustration 3, these factors
make the grantor's story credible, and when the grantee's obligation to
reconvey becomes a term of the parties' agreement, the economic
substance of the transaction becomes a SISO.
Now suppose that the grantor is deceased and the only direct evidence
of the parties' agreement is the grantee's testimony that the parties
Consider
agreed to a sale with no promise of reconveyance.
Restatement section 3 .2, illustration 5:
5. Grantor conveys Blackacre to Grantee by a deed that contains no
language of defeasance. Grantee pays Grantor $25,000 in cash, but
Grantor does not deliver a promissory note to Grantee. Grantor retains
possession, pays the real estate taxes and builds a garage on the premises.
The fair market value of B lackacre at the time of the conveyance is
$50,000. Grantor dies a year after the conveyance and, other than
Grantee, no one else can testify as to what was said at the time the deed
was delivered. Grantee testifies that the parties intended an absolute sale
of Blackacre. Nevertheless, the facts justify the conclusion that the
138
parties intended a security transaction.

In addition to the factors specified in illustration 3 (Grantor's retention
of possession and payment of real estate taxes), in illustration 5 the
deceased grantor had built a garage on the property following the
conveyance. Inasmuch as there can be no mortgage without an
obligation that is secured, the fact that there is no direct evidence that

13 7. RESTAT EMENT THIRD, PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 3.2 cmt. e, illus. 3.
!38. !d.§ 3.2 cmt. e, illus. 5.
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(deceased) Grantor was entitled to a reconveyance upon discharge of a
specified obligation is problematic. The comments indicate, however,
that "it is unnecessary to establish either the existence of a promissory
note or similar written evidence of the debt or that the grantor is
personally liable to repay it. Rather a court may impute the existence of
the debt where the totality of the facts indicate that a security transaction
was intended. " 139 In illustration 5, the factors strongly suggest the
transaction was for security and appear sufficient to permit the trier of
fact to disbelieve Grantee's testimony. After all, why else would
Grantor have conveyed property in exchange for half its fair market
value, remained in possession rent-free, paid real estate taxes, and built a
garage? 140
For the most part the types of "factors" that attend a purported sale of
receivables, including any recourse against the seller, lack the
meaningful economic impact of the factors involved in illustration 5,
such as rent-free retention of possession, payment of taxes, and
construction of a new building on the property. Absent express terms
providing that the "seller" will share in the value of the "sold"
receivables, the most significant factor that may be seen in a receivables
transaction is a disparity between the price paid and the value of the
receivables. In connection with Example 5, below, we address the
question whether such a price-value disparity alone could be an
adequate basis for recharacterization of a purported sale of
receivables. 141 We conclude that it should not be.

B. Illustrative Examples
The following examples illustrate how our approach to
recharacterization might be applied. Example 1 is a transaction facially
structured as (i.e., using the terminology of) a sale of receivables, but its
terms mirror as closely as possible a SISO transaction.

139. !d. § 3.2 cmt. e.
140. As comment e suggests, had Grantor and Grantee been party to a long-term lease of the
property in questi on, the inference th at th e absolute deed was in fact for sec urity wou ld have been
significantly weaker. !d. Regardless, inferring an obligation gives rise to a host of operational
problems . What would be the amount of the secured obligation and when would it be du e'? Pres umab ly
a court wou ld conc lude that the implicit (or explicit) agreement must have been that th e $25,000 paid by
Grantee was th e principal amount, that Grantor would pay interest at a "reasonable'· rate (such as a
statutory rate of interest), and that the principal and interest would be due at a "reasonab le" time. Cf
U.C. C. § 2-305 (if the price is an open term in a contract for sale of goods th en the price wil l be a
"reasonable price") ; id. § 2-309 (if the time for shipment or delivery is not spec ified in a contract for
sa le of goods then th e time wi ll be a "reasonable time"). And assuming a judicial determination
consistent with the result in illustration 5, what wou ld Grantee then be required to plead and prove in
order to foreclose its "mortgage"?
141. See inji-a Part V.B (Example 5).
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Example 1:
Seller (S) agrees to sell and Buyer (B) agrees to buy specified receivables
for a purchase price equal to ninety percent of the present value of the
receivables (assuming payment by the account debtors when due) . The
present value is calculated at a market discount rate, which takes into
account the time value of money and the risk of account debtor default, so
that the price roughly equals ninety percent of the fair market value of the
142
receivables.
B has full recourse against S arising out of an account
debtor's default: If any receivable is not paid when due, Sis obligated to
repurchase the receivable for an amount equal to the account debtor's
payment obligation. If S fails to pay any repurchase obligation, S is
obligated to pay interest on the amount due at a specified rate per annum.
Notwithstanding S's full recourse repurchase obligation, B's aggregate
recovery from the receivables and S's repurchase payments (S's
maximum obligation) is capped at ninety percent of the face amount of
the receivables (the original purchase price plus imputed interest). B is
obligated to remit to S the amount of any recovery exceeding this cap. In
addition, S has an option to repurchase the receivables at any time for the
repurchase price of ninety percent of the face amount of the receivables
(adjusted to present value if the repurchase occurs before the receivable
due date).

As a matter of economic substance and legal obligation, Example 1 is
equivalent to a loan. B's interest in the receivables is a SISO, and
Article 9 applies as it would to any loan secured by receivables. The
principal amount of the loan is equal to the purchase price of the
receivables advanced by B to S (ninety percent of the present value of
the receivables). The principal becomes due, along with imputed
interest, as the receivables become due. The principal (the purchase
price) bears interest in an amount equal to the difference between the
principal amount and ninety percent of the face amount of the
receivables. S' s recourse obligation, as limited by the ninety percent
cap, constitutes the obligation secured by the security interest in the
receivables . To the extent that S's obligation to repay the principal and
interest is not satisfied by collection of the receivables, Sis liable for the
diffe rence. If S fails to make a required principal payment (the
repurchase price due on an account debtor default), that payment bears
interest at an agreed default rate. In effect, the parties have agreed that
the manner of repayment in the ordinary course will be B's receipt of
collections on receivables when due, but this feature does not affect the
142. The ri sk premium reflects the ri sk that the receivable may not be collected in full from th e
account debtor or from Sunder the full recourse arrangement and con seq uently that the recei vables may
be less va luable than th e present value of the amounts payab le. ln the real wo rld there could be a furth er
haircut or " holdback'' so that B would pay less up front and thereby maintain a greater cushion of
receivab les val ue over the amount ad vanced to S.

1064

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

nature of the payments to B as repayments of principal and payments of
interest.
Note the significance of the cap on S's obligation (and B's recoveries)
and of S's repurchase option: because B will not be entitled to collect
and retain the full face amount of the receivables, S has retained an
economic interest in them. By analogy to a leasing transaction, S has a
meaningful residual interest in the receivables, just as a true lessor has a
residual interest in leased goods, and B has not captured the entire
economic value of the receivables, just as a true lessee has only a
leasehold interest in leased goods. It follows that the transaction is not a
true sale to B. And because S has the right to recover the interest
transferred by paying a noncancellable obligation, the transaction is a
SISO. 143 Note that the interest in the receivables retained by S sufficient
to obviate true sale treatment need not be based on an explicit
contractual retention of an in rem right or interest but may be the
economic equivalent.
In Kettering's view, the law should respect the true-sale
characterization chosen by the parties unless recharacterization is
necessary to prevent the purported seller from suffering a forfeiture for
144
failing to make a contemplated performance.
In Example 1, however,
the terms of the parties' agreement appear to afford the "seller" the
antiforfeiture protection afforded to a debtor under a SISO. Resort to
Article 9' s antiforfeiture provisions would not be necessary. Under
Kettering's purposive approach, then, the transaction in Example 1
would stand as a true sale. 145 If the law were to treat Example 1 as a
true sale, however, then any typical loan secured by receivables could be
stmctured as a true sale without there being any meaningful difference
in the economic substance of the transaction or the contractual
obligations of the parties.
Kettering acknowledges that the
recharacte1ization of a true sale of receivables may bring about
consequences unrelated to the risk of forfeiture , but he deems them
insufficient to warrant a standard for recharacterization other than the
prevention of forfeiture . 146 We think the stakes are higher.
Suppose that the receivables in Example 1 were payment intangibles
and that B did not file a financing statement covering them. If the form
of the transaction is respected, then B 's security interest would be
perfected; recharacterization, however, would result in B's security

143. Thi s aspect of the transaction is explored again in connection with Example 3, infra.
144. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26 , at 539 ("[T]here is nothing in th e structure of Article 9
that prov ides a good reason for recharacterizati on o f a sale of receivables to be govern ed by a standard
different from the antiforfeiture principle from which th e doctrine evolved.").
145. U. C.C. § 9-607(c).
146. See Ketterin g, True Sale, supra note 26, at 533-39.
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interest being unperfected and thus vulnerable to the claims of
competing creditors and subsequent buyers. 147 This is because a true
sale of payment intangibles is perfected automatically, but perfection of
a SISO in payment intangibles requires the giving of public notice by
filing a financing statement. 148
Kettering would allow the parties to a transaction that is the economic
equivalent of a SISO in payment intangibles to avoid the consequences
of the failure to give public notice of the resulting security interest by
structuring the transaction as a true sale. In his view, the Article 9
policy of requiring public notice of SISOs is not an appropriate basis on
which to recharacterize what the parties have documented as a true sale.
He writes:
It would be specious to contend that recharacterization analysis should be
altered as a result of the rule affording automatic perfection to sales of
payment intangibles and promissory notes, on the theory that the public
notice afforded by compliance with the ordinary perfection requirements
of Article 9, required in the case of a secured loan, is so desirable as to
weigh in favor of a low standard for recharacterizing such sales as
149
secured loans.

Note that Kettering's claim follows directly from his own proposed
analysis but would make no sense under our analysis, the analyses in the
case law, or those offered by earlier commentators. Kettering's analysis
tailors the recharacterization doctrine as may be necessary to promote a
specific purpose. If there is more than one purpose to be served by
recharacterization, then different standards for recharacterization may
arise with respect to a single transaction. Having identified one purpose
that justifies recharacterization, i.e., to prevent forfeiture, the
identification of a second purpose, i.e., to promote Article 9's policy of
requiring public notice of SISOs, would require that the standard for
recharacterization be "altered" and, at least in the case under discussion,
"lower[ ed]." 150 Such an alteration apparently would be justified only if

147. An unperfected sec urity interest generally is junior to the rights of lien creditors and holders
of perfected security interests. U.C.C. § 9-317(a) (lien creditors); id. § 9-322(a)(2) (security interests).
148. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (providing the general rule that a financing statement must be filed to
perfect a security interest); id. § 9-31 O(b )(2) (providing that a security interest that is perfected when it
attaches is an exception to the genera l rule); id. § 9-309(3) (providing that a sale of a payment intangible
is perfected when it attaches). Likewise, a sale of promissory notes is perfected automatically but a
SlSO is not. See id. § 9-309(4) (providing that a sale of a promissory note is perfected when it attaches).
But see id. § 9-312(e) (providing for temporary perfection of a security interest in instruments that arises
for new va lue under an authenticated security agreement). For convenience, the discussion in the text
refers only to payment intangibles.
149. Kettering, T111e Sale, supra note 26, at 538.
150. !d. at 538.
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it yielded an outcome that is particularly "desirable." 151 Article 9's
perfection policy, at least in this case, does not meet that test. 152
Moreover, "[ e]ven if the public notice afforded by filing were thought
desirable, lowering the standard for recharacterization would be a
terrible way to induce more filings, for no standard for
recharacterization follows from such a purpose; the result would be
arbitrary and unpredictable." 153
Finally, recharacterization of a
transaction in order to promote the perfection policy might result in
application of the antiforefeiture provisions, even when the seller
retained no otherwise protectable interest in the receivables. 154
Unlike Kettering, we think the transaction in Example 1 should be
recharacterized as a SISO for purposes of Article 9, even if the only
legal consequence of recharacterization would be the loss of
perfection. 155 We recognize that the "automatic perfection" rule for
sales of payment intangibles does not follow from the inherent economic
differences between the two transactions. 156 But we think it would be a
mistake to construe the reference in section 9-309(3) to "a sale of a
payment intangible" to include a transaction, like Example 1, that is the
economic equivalent of a SISO. When it comes to characterizing a
transaction as a SISO, the UCC elevates substance over form. 157 Even
though the courts have not adopted a clear rule for distinguishing true
sales from SISOs, the "sale-distinguishing" rules of Revised Article 9
were written on the understanding that there is a real economic
difference between the two transactions. We think that all the salerelated provisions of Article 9-not just the antiforfeiture provisionsshould be construed to reflect that difierence. We do not advocate for
an "altered" recharacterization test but seek to identify and justifY what
is and should be the appropriate test.
Under our analysis, one need not inquire into the strength of the
policy requiring public notice for security transfers (SISOs) of payment
intangibles. Regardless of whether the original decision to subject true
sales of cetiain receivables to the perfection and priority rules of Article
9 (including the general rule that a financing statement must be filed in
order to perfect) reflects the difficulty of distinguishing a true sale from
151. !d.
152. Kettering supports his claim that promotion of the perfection policy is not "so desirable" in
the setting under consideration by observing that even before Revised Article 9 introduced the
"automatic perfection"' rule, a buyer of payment intangibles may have needed to take steps to protect
itself against the claims of third parties. !d.
153. !d.
154. !d.
155. But there are other consequences outside of bankruptcy. See supra Part III.
156. !d.
157. !d.
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a SIS0 158 or was "the result of an historical accident that had nothing to
do" with the difficulty of drawing such a distinction, 159 and regardless of
whether one thinks the policy is beneficial 160 or is of "questionable
utility," 161 the sponsors reaffirmed this decision when they expanded the
application of the general rule to sales of receivables that were
previously outside the scope of Article 9. 162 The fact that the drafters
advertently applied the ordinary perfection rules to SISOs in payment
intangibles is reason enough for courts to determine-as they must do
when considering a purported lease of goods-whether a purported sale
should be recharacterized as a SISO.
The failure to recharacterize the putative sale in Example 1 also
would deprive the seller (debtor) of the benefit of nonwaivable rights
and duties provided by Article 9. 163 Moreover, the rights of third parties
also would be compromised. True sale treatment would mean that
future creditors, secured and unsecured, could not reach the receivables
that otherwise would be available to them were the transaction
recharacterized as a SIS0. 164 Although these consequences have
nothing to do with the antiforfeiture principle, that fact would not
ameliorate the adverse impact for those who would be aggrieved by the
failure to recharacterize the transaction in Example 1.
Finally, recharacterization of a putative sale as a SISO under

158. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. (1972) ("[C]ertain sales of accounts and chattel paper are brought
within this Article to avoid di fficu lt problems of distin gui shing between transacti ons intended for
sec urity and those not so intended.").
159. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 515. Fo r a detailed description of the hi storical
background leading to the inc lusion of true sales of receivab les in the Article 9 filing sys tem, see
Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale ofAccozmts and Chattel Paper under the
U. C. C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. R EV. 397, 413-25,
436--39 ( 1994).
160. This is Professo r Shu pack's view.
Art icle 9 provides a second benefit to buyers of payment streams within its scope. If these
transactions are within Arti cle 9, the order of filing und er Artic le 9 determines priority among
competing buye rs of the same intangible asset. There ca n be no equivalent certainty of
ownership and pri ority of ri ghts with respect to sold payment streams that are not subject to
Article 9.
Shupack, supra note 28, at 169.
161. Plank, supra note 46, at 471 (citing Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under Article 9:
Strucl!iral Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 249-62 (2007)).
162 . See supra notes 27- 30.
163. U.C.C. § 9-2 10(b) (ri ghts to receive a response to requests for an accounting, regardin g a list
of collateral, and regarding a statement of account); id. § 9-608(a) (appli cation of proceeds of collection
and enforc ement). Because the buyer (sec ured party) in Example 1 is entitled to recourse aga inst th e
seller (debtor), however, the buyer wou ld be required to coll ect and enforce the rece ivab les in a
commercially reasonable manner even if the transaction were characterized as a tru e sale. Jd. §S 960 I (g), 9-607(c).
164. U.C.C. § 9-3! 8(a) (seller of receivables retains no lega l or equitable interest in th e collateral
sold ).
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nonbankruptcy law would have significant consequences in the
bankruptcy proceeding of the seller (debtor). Specifically, the seller's
interest in the receivables would become property of the estate, and the
buyer would be stayed from collecting the receivables. 165 As we have
already observed, unless a federal interest requires a different result,
bankruptcy law respects nonbankruptcy property interests that are
defined by state law. 166 We see no federal interest that would justify
recharacterizing in bankruptcy a transaction that is a SISO under
nonbankruptcy law, and we are not aware of anyone who has taken the
position that a SISO under nonbankruptcy law would not or should not
be treated as such in bankruptcy. 167 In our view this demonstrates why
the transaction in Example 1 should be recharacterized under
nonbankruptcy law even though the antiforfeiture principle is not
compromised.
Adoption of the single standard for recharacterization we advocate,
i.e., whether a transaction is the functional and economic equivalent of a
SISO, would render irrelevant Kettering's concerns about the risk of
multiple recharacterization standards and about the uncertainly that
might follow from a standard designed solely to promote Article 9's
notice-filing policy. Our property-based standard also would eliminate
any risk of imposing the antiforfeiture rules inappropriately. The
antiforfeiture rules would apply only when the "seller" retains an
interest in the "sold" receivables that is the functional and economic
equivalent of a SISO, as is the case in Example 1. We tum now to
Example 2, which significantly alters the facts of Example 1.
Example 2:
Example 2 differs from Example 1 in four respects. First, the purchase
price is a fraction of the face amount of the receivables that approximates
the fair market value of the receivables. Second, S has no recourse
obligation to repurchase receivables in the event of account debtor
defaults, i.e., B has assumed the entire credit !"isk of account debtor
nonpayment. Third, S does not have an option to repurchase receivables
at ninety percent of the face amount. Finally, B's recoveries from the
receivables are not capped at ninety percent ofthe face value.
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (2012) (providing that the estate includes "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"); id. § 362(a)(3) (proh ibiting the
taking of "any ac t to obtain possession of property of the estate ... or to exercise control over property
of the estate"); id. § 362(a)(4) (prohibiting the taking of"any act to ... enforce any lien against property
of the estate").
166. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
167 . Kettering has argued the converse, i.e., that "there are excellent reasons why a court so
inclined could conc lude that a sale of receivables in a securitization transaction is not a true sale for
bankruptcy pwposes even though it is a tme sale under nonban/..Tuptcy law." Kettering, True Sale,
supra note 26, at 513 (emphasis added). We reserve for another day our response in oppos ition to his
argument.

2014]

WHEN IS A D OG'S TAIL NOT A L EG?

1069

We see no basis for recharacterizing the Example 2 transaction as a
SISO. By definition, a secured obligation is an essential element of a
SIS0. 168 That element, which is present in Example 1, is completely
lacking in Example 2. 169 Moreover, the absence of S's repurchase
option and the absence of the cap on B's recoveries underscore the fact
that S has retained no meaningful interest in the receivables sold to B
and that B has captured the entire economic value of the receivables.
Examples 1 and 2 make clear that the presence of a purported seller's
recourse obligation may be a key element in recharacterizing a
purported sale as a SISO. To be sure, the absence of a conventional
recourse obligation may not ensure true sale treatment. 170 Likewise, the
existence of recourse does not always dictate SISO treatment. 171 But
Kettering ' s claim that the existence of a seller-recourse obligation is
irrelevant to the true sale issue and that such recourse is like any other
form of warranty of quality cannot stand. 172 We do not disagree that an
element of credit recourse is analogous to a warranty of quality, but in a
purported sale of receivables transaction it may have additional
significance.
Next consider Example 3.
Example 3:
Like Example 1 (a SISO), but unlike Example 2 (a true sale), S has a full
recourse repurchase obligation in case of account debtor defaults.
However, unlike Example 1 but like Example 2, S does not have an
option to repurchase receivables at ninety percent of the face amount, and
S' s maximum obligation (i.e., B' s aggregate recovery from the
receivables and S's repurchase payments) is not capped at ninety percent
of the face amount of the receivables.

Does the elimination of S' s option to repurchase and the elimination
of the cap on S' s obligation affect the characterization of the transaction
as a SISO? Because Example 3 retains Example 1's full recourse
repurchase obligation on S but eliminates the cap on S's liability, S has
\ 68. U.C. C. § l-20l (b)(3 5) ('" Security interest ' means an interest in personal prope rty or fi xtures
whi ch secures payment or perform ance of an obli gation.").
169. Return again to the leasing analogy and reca ll th e importance of identify ing the obli gati on
sec ured as an essenti al element of a SISO . See sup ra note 11 6. The familiar Articl e 9 concepts of
default and calculati on of surplus and defi ciency simpl y do not fit th e transaction in Exa mple 2.
170. See the disc ussi on of Example 4 infi"a.
17 1. See th e di scussion of Example 3 infra.
172. See Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 539 ("Reco urse to the sell er is irre leva nt to
rec haracterizati on, for the existence of recourse has nothi ng to do with the exis tence of a potential
fo rfe iture to th e seller in the event of th e seller's fa ilure to perfonn as contemplated, and it is th e latter
that is the concern of the recharacteri zation doctri ne."); id. at 543 ("A buyer of a receivab le wh o obtains
from th e se ller a warranty of its timel y collectibility is in the same position as th e bu yer of the motor. ").
As discussed in conn ection with Example 3, however, we agree wi th Ketterin g's principa l argu ment, our
diffe renc es with his " irre levance" claim notwithsta ndin g.
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assumed even greater responsibility for account debtor performance. By
the conventional wisdom of measuring and weighing benefits and
burdens of ownership, S' s greater responsibility makes Example 3 seem
even less like a true sale (and more like a SISO) than Example l. But
we believe that the transaction in Example 3 should be afforded true sale
treatment notwithstanding S's full recourse obligation.
Both Example 1 and Example 3 allow B to collect from the account
debtors and from S. As we discussed, in Example 1 B is not entitled to
retain the full face amount of the receivables. Once B collects an
amount equal to the cap on B's recovery, S is entitled to any excess
value of the receivables. Moreover, S can realize any excess value by
exercising the option to repurchase a receivable for an amount less than
its face amount and then collecting the entire face amount from the
account debtor. 173 Because S retained an interest in the receivables, the
transaction in Example 1 was not a true sale. In Example 3, however,
B's recovery is not capped. B is entitled to collect the full face amount
from the account debtors or, if they default, from S. S's position is also
different in the two examples. In each, S may become entitled to collect
from the account debtors, butS's recovery in Example 3 is limited to the
amount of the repurchase price that Spaid to B. Thus Swill obtain from
the transaction no more than the purchase price that B paid S. And
because S has no option to repurchase, S has no right to reacquire any
receivables that become more valuable than the repurchase price. In
short, unlike in Example 1, S has retained no economic interest in the
receivables. Thus, one of the essential characteristics of a SISO is
missing in Example 3.
Of course, in one sense S does have an economic stake in the
receivables in Example 3: collections by B from the account debtors
reduce the exposure of Sunder its recourse repurchase obligations. But
this stake arises from the fact that Sis a surety on the receivables; it is
not the economic (typically, ownership) interest of a debtor in a SISO.
Any relevant duties in this respect owed to S, as surety, by B, as creditor,
would be governed by the law of suretyship and not by Article 9.
Example 3 is a simplified version of the full recourse transactions
addressed in Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 174
perhaps the most commonly cited authority for recharacterizing a
purported sale as a SISO based on recourse against the seller for account
173. Changes in market interest rates might make it advantageous for S to borrow e lsew here at a
lower cost and use the fund s to exercise its repurc hase opti on (i.e., to prepay the secured loan). In the
economic and pricing stm cture of Examples I and 2 it is unlikely that a receivable \Vould have a value
materially greater than the repurchase obligation, but in other stmctures a greater disparity might exist.
In circumstances in whi ch it makes economic sense for S to repurchase, presumably S would repurchase
all of the receivables.

174. 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979).
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debtor defaults. We think that Major's was wrongly decided- full
recourse against the seller notwithstanding- because the buyer was
entitled to all collections of the receivables (albeit supported by the
seller' s recourse obligations) and the seller retained no interest. 175 We
believe that Kettering's analysis is correct. The only value associated
with the receivables arises from collections from the account debtors. In
Example 3, B is entitled to all of the collections with none of that value
being retained by or returned to S. B is entitled to the entire value ;
consequently, the transaction is a true sale.
We suspect that some may find our conclusion to be counterintuitive.
One arguably problematic aspect of the analysis relates to the fact that,
in a SISO (such as in Example 1), the debtor's predefault waiver of its
right to redeem the receivables would not be enforceable. 176 It might
seem ironic that simply striking out the contract provisions that give rise
to that right- the repurchase option and the cap on liability-effectively
eliminates the otherwise nonwaivable right. On reflection, however, the
irony must give way. The exercise here is to fathom whether the
purported seller has sold everything; an agreement that results in the
seller retaining nothing demonstrates that the seller has in fact done so.
Given that in a SISO transaction the right of redemption is statutory
and need not be preserved or provided for by contract, 177 it may seem
odd that the contractual provisions present in Example 1 but missing in
Example 3 play such a pivotal role. But all one can glean from this is
that the absence of an express redemption right does not preclude
recharacterization of a purported true sale as a SISO. Indeed, a typical
secured loan (not dressed in a sale's clothing) does not expressly
provide for a right of redemption, yet normally the question would not
even arise as to whether the transaction was a SISO or whether the
debtor had a redemption right. Thus, although the presence of an
express redemption right is relevant to characterization, its absence is
not. When in substance a seller conveys its entire interest in a
receivable, the seller retains no interest that can be foreclosed and so
.
. h t tore deem. 178
enJoys
no ng

l 75. Kettering reac hes th e same conclusion, but his ana lysis differs somewha t. We think th e
tran saction in Major's is a true sale because the seller reta ined no in terest in the receivables. Ketteri ng
thinks that the transacti on is a true sale because there is no ri sk that the seller would forfeit an y interest
in the col lec ti ons as a result of any default-like event on its part. See Kettering, Tn~e Sale, supra note
26, at 54 1 (c riti cizing the holding in Major's Furniture Mart, In c. v. Cas tle Credit Corp. , 602 F.2d 538
(3d Cir. 1979)) . Of cou rse, the reason the seller would not forfeit an interest in th e collections is that th e
seller retained no such interes t.
176 . U.C.C. § 9-602( 11 ).
I 77. !d. § 9-623 .
l 78 . As Ketterin g noted:
The nonwaivable eq uity of redemption embedded in Artic le 9. and the recharacterization
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We concluded that S retained no interest in the receivables because B
was entitled to all of the collections on the receivables. Because of S's
recourse obligation, however, B does have an economic stake in B 's
collections on the receivables: every dollar collected reduc es B 's
contingent, secondary obligation. But the question is whether the
interest transferred to B is a SISO, with the result that B would have
obtained only a security interest instead of full ownership and S would
have retained an interest. That S has a recourse obligation cannot
determine whether S has retained an interest. An obligation on a
receivable, including a secondary obligation, does not constitute or
evidence a property interest in the receivable itself. 179 A surety for an
obligation acquires no interest in the obligation until and unless it
acquires such an interest such as by assignment or through
subrogation. 180
As we have acknowledged above, we are mindful that the analysis of
a transaction against the template of a SISO will not always be
straightforward or easy. More complicated transactional structures may
yield less clear conclusions than the simple examples discussed here .
But when the facts are messy, it is particularly useful to know what one
is looking for. The object of the investigation should be the existence,
or not, of an obligation of the purported seller that is secured by the
receivables transferred to the buyer, as evidenced by an economic
interest or benefit that is retained by the purported seller. The specific
terms of the parties' agreement are relevant only insofar as they relate to
the existence, or not, of such an interest and such an obligation. But a
putative seller's recourse obligation does not reflect a property interest
in the assigned receivables.
Next consider Example 4.
Example 4:
Example 4 includes several significant variations from Example 1. The
purchase price paid by B to S is about half of the fa ir market va lue of the
receivables. S' s repurchase-option price is equal to the ori g inal purchase
price paid by B with two adjustments: a downward adjustment to take
account of amounts collected from account debtors and paid to B and an
upward adjustment to compensate B for the time value of mone y
(imputed interest) to the extent not re±1ected in the purchase price. S's

doctrine that defends it, overrides freedom of contract to the extent of preventing a party from
enforceab ly agreeing to the economi c equi val ent of a stri ct foreclos ure in the event that the pa11y
fa ils to carry ou t a contemplated perform ance. It is not a general lmrrantfo;· relieving a par(v
ji-om th e consequences of selling on hard terms.
Kettering, True Sale, sup ra note 26, at 541 (emphasis add ed).
179 . See supra Part IV .A- B.
180 . However, in a proper case (such as in Exa mple I) a reco urs e obli gati on may const itute th e
obli gation secured by the ass igned receivables.

Ii
I
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repurchase option expires six months after the transaction date. The
receivables are payable by account debtors in monthly installments over a
period of years. As in Example 2, S has no recourse obligation.

One might conclude that the transaction in Example 4 cannot be a
SISO because there is no obligation secured. The purchase option is just
that, an option.
S has no enforceable contractual obligation to
repurchase the receivables. Yet Example 4 is a classic example of a sale
that is absolute in form but which would be recharacterized as a secured
loan. 181 By failing to exercise the option, S would forfeit half the value
of the receivables. For this reason, one can be confident that Sis just as
likely to exercise the option as S would be to fulfill a contractual
obligation to repurchase. Thus the repurchase-option price in Example
4 is a secured obligation, even though it is an obligation based on
economic compulsion and not on a contractual undertaking. 182 As S is
the debtor in a SISO transaction, Article 9 will protect S' s economic
interest in the receivables, including its equity of redemption, if S is
unable to pay the repurchase-option price before the option expires by
its terms (i.e., if Sis unable to satisfy the secured obligation when due).
The analysis here is essentially the same as with a bargain or nominal
purchase option in favor of a lessee of goods upon expiration of the
lease term : the bargain option economically compels the lessee to
exercise it. 183
It is fundamental that the identification of a secured obligation is a
necessary and useful analytical approach to the true sale versus SISO
dichotomy. The bargain option price also demonstrates that S has
retained a meaningful economic interest in the receivables (i.e., that B
has not acquired their entire value) and that, accordingly, true sale
treatment would not be appropriate. This is true even though, as in
Example 4, the parties ' agreement does not expressly provide B with a
right of redemption or a residual interest. The bargain repurchase option
is the practical economic surrogate for such an express provision and so
constitutes the secured obligation.
181. See supra note 13 7 and acc ompanying text.
182. We make thi s point with a problem in o ur casebook in vo lving a recharacteri zed lease und er
wh ich a purchase option price is properly treated as a pa rt of the secured obligation. HARR IS &
MOONEY, supra note 116, at 319 (Pro blem 5. 1.3 ). A thi rd party might attack the sale as a constructi ve
fraudul ent tran sfe r. Assum in g that B acted in good faith, B would be entitled to a credi t or li en for the
va lue it advanced. See, e.g., UN !F. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(d) (1984). Avo idance and
recharacterization thu s would yield the same result, or at least a similar one. Kettering claims that our
position- that a secured obligation is nec essary for rec haracteri zation- is circu lar because
" recharacterization itse lf can create the secured obligation" and he points to our ana lysis o f Example 4
as a case in point. Kettering Memorandum, supra note 4 8, at 6. But he misconstnt es our position ,
which is that th e tenn s of a transac ti on must prov ide a basis for dete rmining that there is an obligation
secu red. As stated in the text, it need not be an exp licit and enforceable contrac tua l o bligation.
183. See U.C.C. § l-203(b)(4) (purc hase option for no or nomin a l cons ideration).
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Consider next Example 5.
Example 5:
Example 5 makes only one variation from Example 4. It eliminates S's
option to repurchase the receivables.

In Example 4 S' s bargain repurchase option was the linchpin of the
SISO analysis. It provided the obligation that was secured and the
means by which S retained an interest in the receivables. Because
Example 5 removes this repurchase option, we believe that the transfer
of receivables is a true sale.
Contrary to the position of Aicher and Fellerhoff, 184 in our view a
disparity between the sales price and the value of the receivables being
sold should not be sufficient of itself for recharacterization of the
transaction as a SISO. Nor do we believe that such a disparity should be
given a prominent role, as Plank proposed. 185 The attention to disparity
between price and value is grounded on the idea that rational actors
normally do not sell property for much less than its value, while
borrowers that provide collateral typically provide collateral of a value
in excess of their secured obligation. A substantial disparity arguably
indicates that even though neither the transaction documents nor the
testimony proves that there was a bargain purchase option, the parties
must have agreed that the purported seller enjoyed a right to repurchase
the transferred receivables at a bargain price.
This thinking seems to underlie the approach of the Restatement. As
we have seen, the Restatement includes "the presence of a substantial
disparity between the value received by the grantor and the fair market
value of the real estate at the time of the conveyance" among the
circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that a deed absolute
was intended to serve as security. 186 Where, as in illustration 3 of
Restatement section 3.2, the grantor and grantee offer conflicting
testimony concerning the terms of the parties' agreement, the fact of a
substantial disparity may assist the trier of fact in determining whom to
believe. 187 Thus, in illustration 3, the disparity between the amount
advanced by Grantee ($25 ,000) and the value ofBlackacre at the time of
the conveyance ($50,000), together with the fact that Grantor retained
possession of Blackacre and continued to pay real estate taxes, gives
credence to Grantor's testimony that Grantee promised to reconvey
Blackacre upon Grantor' s payment of $35 ,000. In other words, in
illustration 3, the determinative fact is Grantor's option to obtain a

184. See supra Part Ill. B.
185. See id.
186. RESTATEM ENT THI RD, P ROPERTY (MO RTGAGES )§ 3.2(b )(2).
187. See id.
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reconveyance of Blackacre at a bargain price, not the substantial
disparity between the value of Blackacre and the amount Grantor
received for it.
We return to the broader point: The terms of the transaction dictate its
characterization. Unless the terms have the effect of providing for the
transferor to retain an interest in the property transferred (which would
be the case, for example, if the term include a mechanism by which the
transferor can compel reconveyance of the property), the transaction is
not a SISO. In the mortgage context, a person seeking to recharacterize
a deed absolute as a mortgage is given considerable leeway to prove the
terms of the transaction. But we doubt that, as an evidentiary matter, the
disparity between the value of the transferred property and the value
given to the transferor should be sufficient to prove that a transaction is
a SISO, particularly in the context of securitization of receivables. The
large disparity between price and value in Example 5 does suggest that
the parties may not have entered into a true sale, inasmuch as one must
wonder whyS would fully divest itself of receivables for only about half
of their value. But if disparity alone supported recharacterization, the
terms of the SISO transaction would not be apparent. As we noted in
connection with illustration 5 to Restatement section 3.2, presumably the
deemed loan would have been in the amount of the price paid by B to S
in Example 5, and perhaps it would be due at a "reasonable time" and
bear a "reasonable" interest rate. 188 In the real world of receivables
transactions, in which sophisticated parties and well drafted documents
predominate, it is extremely unlikely that there would occur great
disparities in price and value in the absence of other terms supporting
SISO treatment. 189 It follows that the question whether such a disparity
alone would be sufficient to support recharacterization of a purported
sale of receivables is not of practical impmtance. 190
Finally, consider Example 6. 191

188. See supra note 140.
189. It is hard to imagine that S would be arguing that the transaction is a SISO unless S offered
ev id ence that there were other agreed terms to support recharacterization. And, of course, if S does not
oppose true sale treatment then no dispute would exist. In theory, a creditor or insolvency representati ve
would raise the recharacterization issue even in the absence of such parol evidence from S, thus square ly
rai s ing the issue of whether the price-value disparity would be sufficient for recharacterization. But
third parties wo uld not need to rely on recharacterization based on a price-value disparity. The disparity
would permit them to rely on the law of constructive fraudulent transfer. See, e.g., UN!F. FRAUDULENT
TRAN SFER ACT § 4(a)(2) (1984) (providing that certain tran sfers are fraudulent as to a creditor " if the
debtor made the transfer ... without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
trans fer").
190 . Of course, as the preceding footnote indicates, such a disparity may be relevant to other legal
issues implicating the rights of creditors.
191. Example 6 is based on a hypothetical transaction suggested to us by Kettering.
Memorandum, supra note 48, at 6- 7.

Kettering

1076

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL 82

Example 6:
S agrees to sell and B agrees to buy specified receivables for a purchase
price of $1 ,000. The parties expect that the aggregate collections on the
receivables will be $900. B agrees to pay an up-front purchase price
equal to the agreed present value (based on the parties' expectations as to
the timing of future collections) of the $900 anticipated collections. B
further agrees to pay a deferred purchase price equal to fifty percent of
collections on the receivables in excess of $900.

We do not believe that the transaction in Example 6 should be
recharacterized as a SISO. It is true that following the sale S stands to
benefit if B recovers more than the $900 that the parties expect to be
collected and in that respect S retains a future economic stake in the
The fact that the parties
future collections of the receivables.
characterized this stake as a contingent readjustment of the purchase
price does not preclude the possibility that, in a proper case, the stake
could represent an interest retained by S that could support
recharacterization as a SISO. However, recharacterization would not be
appropriate in Example 6 for want of an obligation that would be
secured by the receivables were the transaction to be recharacterized.
On what obligation could S possibly default in order to trigger B's
remedies as a secured party? The absence of a secured obligation
conclusively demonstrates that the transaction is not a SISO.
On another view, arguably S has not sold one hundred percent of its
interest in the receivables and has retained an undivided interest
represented by its contingent right to be paid fifty percent of the
collections in excess of $900. But because the interest acquired by B is
not a SISO (for want of a secured obligation), even if S had retained
such a contingent future interest in the receivables the transaction would
reflect a true sale to B of the interest in the receivables over and above
the interest retained by S.
As a variation on Example 6, assume that B is entitled to recourse
against S to the extent that B recovers less than $900 from the
receivables. As we noted in connection with Example 3, such recourse
does provide S with a stake in the future connections. 192 But also as
explained in that connection, in the setting of Example 3 we view such
recourse as a suretyship obligation of S that does not reflect a retained
interest in the receivables. 193
Should this variation change the
appropriate result in Example 6? One might argue that S's contingent
recourse obligation (up to $900) is the obligation secured (as in Example
1) and that the receivables secure that obligation because S has retained
an interest in the receivables (represented by the contingent future
192. See supra Part V.B (Example 3).
193 . !d.
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interest in collections in excess of $900). We would reject that analysis,
however, because S's right to receive payments on its retained future
interest would ripen only when collections had exceeded $900 and the
contingent recourse obligation had ceased to exist. That is to say, S's
recourse obligation cannot ripen if the receivables have value. S's asset
(the putative collateral) and S's ripened recourse obligation (the putative
secured obligation) cannot coexist.
Example 6 illustrates the inherent difficulties of rules that require
resolution of a dichotomy (lease or SISO, true sale or SISO) based on
terms of transactions that reflect gradations and matters of degree.
There will be hard cases whose proper outcome is disputed. This is not
an exact science.
This di scussion also implicates another, less obvious point. Both
commentary and case law implicitly take as given that, when a
purported sale of a receivable does not qualify for true sale treatment of
the purported seller's entire interest, the transaction must be a SISO. In
our view, however, that conclusion is not inevitable. To be more
precise, a transfer that does not constitute a true sale of the transferor's
entire interest in a receivable nonetheless may also not constitute a SISO
because, for example, there may be no secured obligation (as in
Example 6). Although the transferor retains an interest in the relevant
receivables, the transaction may be a true sale of the portion of the
seller's interest that it purported to transfer. Consider the sale of an
undivided fractional interest in a receivable. Cases involving sales of
participation interests in loans generally have recognized that such a
fractional interest can be the subject of a true sale even though the seller
has itself retained a fractional interest. 194 Similarly, one might have a
true sale of rights to discrete and specific payments of principal and
interest (e. g., a sale of the right to payment of principal and interest due
on a specified date). 195

194. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp . v. Mademoiselle of Cal., 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967). We
acknowledge th at there are important aspects of the law relating to loan parti c ipations that remain
un settled. See, e.g.. Steven L. Sc hwa rcz, Jntennedimy Risk in a Global Economy, 50 D UKE L.J . 154 1,
1558--60 (200 1). The po int to be made for present purposes is that it is possible to have a true sa le of a
rece ivable as to which th e seller remain s the owner of the un sold fractional interest and no S ISO is
created.
195. We can imagine a transfer of less precise and less identifiable rights and interests resu lti ng in
a shared ownershi p in a receivab le, but in a transac tion that would not create a S ISO for wan t of an
identifiable secu red o bli gati o n. While such transactio ns m ay be of conceptua l interes t, we are un certain
whether they are common. Transactio ns in which the seller retains a security intere st in the transferred
receivables to sec ure the buyer' s obligation s to the seller are more common. Of course, the fact th at the
sell er retained a sec urity interes t in the receivab les is not at all in co nsistent with the buyer beco ming the
owner and the transac ti o n bein g a tru e sale.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article we have advanced a more coherent approach to the
exercise of distinguishing a true sale of receivables from a SISO. In
particular, we have drawn on the experience and learning from the
analogous process of distinguishing a true lease from a SISO. The
central feature of the lease-SISO dichotomy is whether the purported
lessor has retained a meaningful residual interest. If it has, then true
lease characterization, not SISO treatment, is appropriate. In the
receivables context, the central questions are whether a purported seller
has retained a meaningful interest in the receivables that are subject to a
sale to a purported buyer and, if so, whether the interest transferred to
the purported buyer secures an obligation of the seller. Affinnative
answers to these questions should result in SISO characterization. The
existence of a buyer's recourse obligation to a seller may be a significant
factor inasmuch as SISO characterization requires the existence of a
secured obligation and a buyer's recourse may satisfy that requirement.
But such a recourse obligation is not, alone, sufficient to justify
recharacterizing a sale transaction as a SISO. In our view a functional
analysis based on the application of economic realities to the terms of a
transaction offers a more coherent and predictable approach than the
"factors" approach reflected in much of the case law. That approach has
long been rejected by case law and codification in the true lease versus
SISO context, and we believe the same is warranted in the true sale of
receivables versus SISO analysis.

